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A Study of FCC and EEOC Concurrent Jurisdiction*
By GLENDA G. LEATHERMAN
Member, Third Year Class
Now a group of workmen is silhouetted against the dim sky.
From farther away, they are answered by voices of the unemployed.
No man has hired us
With pocketed hands
And lowered faces
We stand about in open places
And shiver in unlit rooms.
Only the wind moves
Over empty fields, untilled
Where the plough rests, at an angle
To the furrow. In this land
There shall be one cigarette to two men,
To two women one half pint of bitter
Ale. In this land
No man has hired us.
Our life is unwelcome, our death
Unmentioned in 'The Times'.
T.S. Eliot
"Choruses from 'The Rock'"
These few lines in "Choruses from 'The Rock' " convey the
despairing effect of unemployment on the human spirit, and thus
impress upon us the importance of employment opportunity to the
quality of life. Sadly, a lack of employment opportunity- persists for
certain classes of people in our country, as discrimination in em-
ployment continues to subject women and minorities to heavy los-
sess in earnings, job security and human dignity.'
Equal employment opportunities for women and minorities be-
came an issue of overriding importance during the civil rights move-
* October 1978, Glenda G. Leatherman.
1. See, e.g., Ewald, Public and Private Enforcement of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964-a Ten Year Perspective, 7 Une. L. ANN. 101 (1974); Gitt and Gelb, Beyond the Equal
Pay Act: Expanding Wage Differential Protections Under Title VII, 8 LOYOLA U.L.J. 723 n.
1-2 & accompanying text (1977). See generally UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGMS,
THE FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT EFFORT, To EuMINATE EMPLOYMENT DiscRMINATIoN:
A SEQUEL (1977). See also notes 11-14, infra, and accompanying text for a description of the
lack of progress in the employment of women and minorities in television.
125
Comm/ENT
ment of the 1960's as a result of an increased sensitivity to the
effects of discrimination.2 During this period, Congress enacted
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,1 which created the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). The primary pur-
pose of the EEOC is implementation of a national policy to elimi-
nate discrimination in employment based on race, color, religion,
sex or national origin.'
Four years later, the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) proposed the adoption of rules to prohibit discrimination in
employment by its broadcast regulatees.1 The power to propose
and adopt these rules was based primarily upon the FCC's broad
statutory authority to regulate in the "public interest".' The im-
portance of regulating employment practices in order to promote the
public interest in broadcasting was aptly expressed by Assistant
Attorney General Stephen Pollack in an advisory letter to the FCC."
In referring to the 1968 rulemaking proposal, he wrote:
Because of the enormous impact which television and radio have
upon American life, the employment practices of the broadcast
industry have an importance greater than that suggested by the
number of its employees. The provision of equal opportunity in
employment in that industry could therefore contribute signifi-
cantly toward reducing and ending discrimination in other indus-
tries.'
When these employment rules were adopted in 1969,1o the FCC
undertook the task of monitoring the discriminatory employment
practices of their regulatees. The result of the 1969 rulemaking was
2. See Cooksey, The Role of Law in Equal Opportunity, 7 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 417
(1966); 0. KERNER, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS (Ban-
tam ed. 1968); Hebert and Reischel, Title VII and the Multiple Approaches to Eliminating
Employment Discrimination, 46 N.Y.U.L. REV. 449 (1971); Note, The FCC's Role in Provid-
ing Equal Employment Opportunity for Minority Groups, 53 B.U.L. REV. 657 (1973).
3. 42 U.S.C. H§ 2000e-2000e-15 (1964), as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000-2003-17 (1976).
4. 42 U.S.C. H# 2000e-4 (1976).
5. 42 U.S.C. H§ 2000e-2 (1976).
6. Broadcast Licensee Nondiscrimination, 13 F.C.C.2d 766 (1968) [hereinafter referred to
as 1968 Rulemaking Proposal].
Pursuant to the notice requirements of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.
§ 553 (1966), the FCC gave notice to the public of its proposed rules on July 3, 1968 and
subsequently adopted them on June 4, 1969. Broadcast Licensee Nondiscrimination, 18
F.C.C.2d 240 (1969); 18 F.C.C.2d 249 (1969) [hereinafter cited as 1969 Rulemaking J.
7. 47 U.S.C. § 307(a) (1934).
8. Letter of Assistant Attorney General S. Pollack, Civil Rights Division of the Department
of Justice, reprinted in 1968 Rulemaking Proposal, supra note 6, at 775-77.
9. Id. at 777.
10. 1969 Rulemaking, supra note 6.
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to give the FCC concurrent jurisdiction with the EEOC over em-
ployment practices in the broadcast industry.
In August of 1977, the United States Commission on Civil Rights
submitted a report to the President and Congress regarding the
status of women and minorities in television broadcasting." In this
report, the Civil Rights Commission studied and made findings on
two major issues: (1) the portrayal of women and minorities on
network television 2 and (2) the employment of members of these
groups at local television stations. 3 Contrary to the apparent im-
provement of the employment situation for women and minorities
in broadcasting," the Commission's major conclusion regarding
employment in television broadcasting was that members of these
groups "are underrepresented on local station work forces and are
almost totally excluded from decision making positions."'- This
finding indicates a most egregious situation since not just one, but
11. UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTs REPORT, "WINDOw DRESSING ON THE SET:
WOMEN AND MINORITIES IN TELEVISION" August 1977 [hereinafter cited as COMMISSION
REPORT]. The release of this report was accompanied by a large amount of coverage by the
print media. See, e.g., Scheer, Rights Commission Assails FCC on TV Hiring Practices, L.A.
Times, Aug. 15, 1977, at 1, col. 1; Aura of Failure Grips FCC in Overseeing TV, L.A. Times,
Aug. 15, 1977, at 1, col. 1; FCC Reply to TV Critique Sees "Censorship" Risk, L.A. Times,
Aug. 17, 1977, at 5, col. 1. For a recent look at motion picture employment opportunities see
CALIFORNIA ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, BEHIND
THE SCENES: EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY IN THE MOTION PICTURE INDUSTRY (Sept. 1978).
12. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 11, at 148. "Portrayal" is used in this context as a
generic category. This category includes such topics as stereotypic portrayals of women and
minorities in drama, representation of women and minorities in network news, and broadcast-
ers' self-regulation of programming.
13. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 11, at 148-49. "Employment" is also used in a generic
sense here. It refers not only to the current employment status of women and minorities at
local television stations but to equal employment opportunity programs that gre to be imple-
mented by these stations.
14. See note 15 infra, which discusses the window dressing effect. The number of women
and minorities employed as on-screen talent has improved. This gives a misleading impres-
sion of overall improvement in the employment of persons in these groups.
15. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 11, at ii. Four specific conclusions underlie this general
finding. They are enumerated on page 148 of the report and may be summarized as follows:
1. Women and minorities are concentrated in lower level subsidiary positions
while white males hold the abundance of decisionmaking positions.
2. Women predominate in the clerical ranks. There has been a marked increase
in the number of minority women in this category in recent years.
3. There is a relatively high proportion of minority females employed as on-screen
talent as compared to those in off-screen positions. The report refers to this as a
"window dressing" effect.
4. The actual employment status of minorities and women has been misrepre-
sented by licensees.
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 11, at 148.
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two, federal agencies have purported to exercise jurisdiction for a
number of years over employment practices in that industry.
The conclusions of the Civil Rights Commission Report demon-
strate that both the FCC and the EEOC have failed to eliminate
discrimination in television broadcasting. For this reason, it is fit-
ting that inquiry be made as to the apparent lack of efficacy of both
agencies in serving this end. Furthermore, the interaction between
these two jurisdictions which has contributed to this failure should
be explored.
This note will first examine the administrative procedures and
actions of both agencies in an attempt to discover an explanation
for the findings of the Civil Rights Commission Report. An analysis
focusing on the FCC and the rationale for its actions will follow.
Possible remedial measures will then be examined from two
perspectives. The first will concern what Congress can or will do in
response to the disheartening findings of the report. The second will
discuss possibilities for corrective measures which exist outside the
ambit of Congressional power to act in this area.
THE EEOC
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196416 prohibits employment
discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex or national origin.'
Its passage led to the creation of the Equal Employment Opportun-
ity Commission (EEOC),15 whose primary function initially was to
administer the informal resolution of discrimination claims under
the Act.
In creating the EEOC, Congress deemed it inappropriate to grant
it enforcement powers." In 1972, however, enforcement powers were
16. 42 U.S.C. H§ 2000e-2000e-15 (1964), as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1976).
17. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1976).
18. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (1976) specifically provides for creation of the Commission.
19. Enforcement of the 1964 Act depended primarily on suits brought in federal district
court by private litigants pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1964). The EEOC was not
allowed to bring suit on behalf of claimants or issue cease-and-desist orders. However, the
Commission could enlist the aid of the U.S. Attorney General, who was authorized to bring
suit when he had reasonable cause to believe a pattern or practice of discrimination existed.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(a) (1964). This authorization to file suit did not extend to individual
complaints.
The reason Congress did not delegate enforcement powers to the EEOC was that in the
1960's, employment discrimination was popularly viewed as consisting of isolated instances
of discriminatory treatment of individuals. See S. REP. No. 92-415, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 5
(1971); H.R. REP 92-238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 8 (1971). It soon became apparent, however,
that most serious discrimination occurred in the systemic practices of employment operations
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granted to the Commission on a limited basis.20 Unfortunately,
there has been a limited use of these powers.2' Consequently, the
EEOC's function has remained essentially the same as it was prior
to 1972:22 they investigate, 23 make findings," attempt conciliation
and that the EEOC would require enforcement powers in order to combat this discrimination.
For a good discussion of the evolution of this realization, see Ewald, supra note 1. Cf.,
Developments in the Law-Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, 84 HARv. L. REV. 1109, 1228-29, 1232 (1971) (individual complaint mechanism is
inadequate). See generally STAFF OF SENATE COMMITPEE ON LABOR AND PUBLIc WELFARE, 92D
CONG., 2D SEss., LEGISLATIVE HisiORY OF THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY Act OF 1972
1586 (Comm. Print 1972).
20. The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 amended Title VII to give the EEOC
limited enforcement powers in the form of allowing it to file civil suit in federal district court
on behalf of individuals if informal methods of conciliation and persuasion have failed. 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1972) (amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(1964)). Evidence of patterns of
discriminatory practices could be used to bolster the individual claimant's case.
However, an attempt to give the Commission enforcement powers consisting of the ability
to issue cease-and-desist orders failed by compromise in the passage of the 1972 amendments.
For an interesting look at Senate debates on this issue see 118 CONG. REc. 590-93 (1972).
21. Hill, The Equal Employment Opportunity Acts of 1964 and 1972, A Critical Analysis
of the Legislative History and Administration of the Law, 2 INDUST. REL. L.J. 1, 84 n.377 &
accompanying text (1977) [hereinafter referred to as Hill]. Statistics cited therein from the
Office of the General Counsel of the EEOC indicate some improvement in the EEOC's use
of its power to file suit on behalf of individual complainants. The number of suits filed each
year since the 1972 amendments are as follows:




1976 (to April 15)............ ............................ 204
However, when compared with the number of charges filed with the EEOC in those years
it becomes apparent that the use of the power to sue has, indeed, been limited.
19 72 ................................................................ 32 ,8 4 0
19 73 . . . .. .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. .. . .. .. . .. .. .. . .. .. . .. .. . .. .. . .. .. . .. .. .. .48 ,89 9
19 74 . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. .. . .. .. . .. .. . .. .. . .. .. . .. .. .. . .. .. . .. .. .. . .. . .56 ,953
19 7 5 . . .. . ... ..... .. . .. . .. . .. .. .. . .. .. . .. .. .. . .. .. . .. .. . .. .. .. . .. . .. 7 1,0 23
19 76 . . . . .. . .. . .. . .. .. . .. . .. .. . .. . .. .. .. . .. .. .. . .. . .. .. . .. .. .. . .. .. . .77 ,0 0 0
Id. at 71 n.302 (using data from the Office of the Executive Director, EEOC). See also Peck,
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission: Developments in the Administrative Pro-
cess 1965-1975, 51 WASH. L. REV. 831, 860 (1976).
Congressional expectations were that these enforcement powers would play a larger role in
compliance than they have. H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., lst Sess. 11-13 (1971); S. REP.
No. 415, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 23-24 (1971).
22. There are indications that this may be changing. A recent Civil Rights Commission
report paints a very optimistic picture regarding a major reorganization of the Commission
which began in mid-1977. UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE FEDERAL CIVIL
RIGrrS ENFORCEMENT EFFORT, To ELIMINATE EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION: A SEQUEL, Chapter
4, at 176-242 (1977) [hereinafter cited as U.S. Civil Rights Comm'n, The Federal Civil Rights
Enforcement Effort (1977)]. Whether the Civil Rights Commission's optimistic prognosis will
be borne out remains to be seen.
23. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1976).
24. Id.
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between employers and those claiming discrimination," and, now,
occasionally file suits in federal district court on behalf of complain-
ants."8
The ultimate power of enforcement under Title VII lies with the
federal courts. Regardless of the outcome of the EEOC complaint
processes, a complainant has the right to file suit in federal district
court" and to have the complaint considered in a trial de novo by
that court.> Any findings by the EEOC, therefore, are not binding
on the court. Moreover, the court has broad discretion to fashion
both retrospective and prospective relief as the inequities of the case
demand. This relief may include injunctive relief,2 affirmative ac-
tion such as reinstatement of hiring, with or without back pay, 0 or
"any other equitable relief the court deems appropriate."3 '
25. Id.
26. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1976) states in pertinent part:
If within thirty days after a charge is filed with the Commission or within thirty
days after expiration of any period of reference . . ., the Commission has been
unable to secure from the respondent a conciliation agreement acceptable to the
Commission, the Commission may bring a civil action against any respondent . . .
named in the charge. . . .
27. If a charge filed with the Commission pursuant to . . . this section is dis-
missed by the Commission, or if within one hundred and eighty days from the filing
of such charge . . . the Commission has not filed a civil action under this section
. . . or the Commission has not entered into a conciliation agreement to which the
person aggrieved is a party, the Commission . . . shall so notify the person ag-
grieved and within ninety days . . . a civil action may be brought against the
respondent named in the charge . . . by the person claiming to be aggrieved. . . .
Id.
28. Title VII does not expressly provide for a trial de novo but the requirement has emerged
through judicial interpretation. For example, McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S.
792, 798-799 (1973), held that the court retains its broad remedial powers despite a Commis-
sion finding of "no reasonable cause", meaning that the court would, therefore, have to make
independent findings of fact regarding violation of the Act. The court in Alexander v.
Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974), affirmed this principle when it stated: "The purpose
and procedures of Title VII indicate that Congress intended federal courts to exercise final
responsibility for enforcement of Title VII. . . ." Id. at 56.
. . . But the courts should ever be mindful that congress, in enacting Title VII,
thought it necessary to provide a judicial forum for the ultimate resolution of
discriminatory employment claims. It is the duty of the court to assume full availa-
bility of this forum.
Id. at 60.
29. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1976).
30. Id. As a general rule if the court finds that the complainant has been discriminated
against, she is presumptively entitled to an award of back pay. Albemarle Paper Co. v.
Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975). Such back pay may be awarded only to a date no earlier than
two years before filing of the charge with the EEOC. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1976).
31. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1976). Other equitable relief may consist of a narrowly limited
award of "retroactive seniority." Retroactive seniority may be awarded back to the date of




Title VII is brought into play by the timely filing of a charge with
the EEOC alleging unlawful discrimination. When the complained-
of discriminatory act occurs in a state with a fair employment prac-
tices agency having substantially similar enforcement powers, the
Act provides that the state agency becomes the forum of first resort
in seeking redress.3 3 This policy of deferral to the state agency by
the EEOC may occur in one of two ways, either of which will delay
action under Title VII.
The first method of deferral is provided for by the Act. The com-
plaint must be filed first with the state fair employment practices
agency within 180 days.34 This filing causes temporary tolling of the
EEOC filing period so that the complaint may be filed with the
EEOC up to 300 days from the date of the alleged discriminatory
act." No charges may be filed with the EEOC within 60 days of
filing with the state commission unless state proceedings terminate
before the end of the 60 day period. 31 If state agency action is termi-
nated, the complainant then has 30 days to file with the EEOC, if
that date is earlier than the 300 day limit.37
The second method of deferral, now embodied in EEOC regula-
tions," arose from EEOC interpretation of its Title VII deferral
policy and was subsequently approved in a judicial decision.39 It is
simpler for the complainant because only one filing is necessary.
The complaint is filed with the EEOC within the regular 180 day
time limit and the EEOC then refers it to the state fair employment
practices agency for action.40 If no action is taken by the state
that it no longer perpetuates the effects of pre-Title VII discrimination. International Brother-
hood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 347-356 (1977).
This was extended in United Air Lines Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553, 559-560 (1977), to
immunize seniority systems that have been altered to be non-discriminatory but which still
perpetuate the discriminatory effects of the old seniority system that was in existence after
Title VII was enacted.
32. A charge of discrimination must be filed within 180 days of the alleged discriminatory
act. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1976). The charge may be filed "by or on behalf of a person
claiming to be aggrieved, or by a member of the Commission." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1976).
33. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c)(1976).
34. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) and (e) (1976).
35. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1976).
36. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) (1976).
37. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1976).
38. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.12 (1977).
39. Voutsis v. Union Carbide Corp., 452 F.2d 889, 892 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S.
918 (1972); Love v. Pullman, 404 U.S. 522, 523 (1972).
40. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.12(b)(1) (1977).
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agency within 60 days, the EEOC proceeds on the complaint."
For deferral to occur, the state agency must be one with powers
similar to those of the EEOC.4 2 The findings and resolutions of the
state agency are not binding on the EEOC, but the Commission is
required to give substantial weight to final determinations of these
agencies." The provision of a remedy in one forum will have the
practical effect of limiting remedies available in the other so as to
prevent "duplicative relief which would result in an unjust enrich-
ment or windfall to the plaintiff.""
Upon receiving the charge, the EEOC must notify the respondent
within ten days that a charge has been filed against him." The
charging party was previously protected to some extent by not being
identified in this notice. Since 1976, however, the notice to the res-
pondent is to include the name of the charging party."
By law, the EEOC has 180 days from receipt of the charge in
which to investigate and make a finding as to whether or not there
is "reasonable cause to believe" a Title VII violation has occurred.47
In practice, an investigation is rarely even initiated during the 180
day period due to the tremendous backlog of charges filed with the
41. Id.
42. Deferral is required only to those agencies "whose laws prohibit essentially all of the
practices prohibited by title VII, by essentially all of the persons by whom such practices are
illegal under title VII, and on essentially all of the grounds covered by title VII." 37 Fed. Reg.
9215 (1972).
43. Title VII does not condition federal action on the outcome of any state action and only
requires the EEOC to give "substantial" rather than "conclusive" weight to final agency
determinations. 42 U.S.C. §2000e-5(b) (1976). Furthermore, the agency must demonstrate
that it operates effectively and with laws offering protection comparable to federal law in
order for the EEOC to give its findings "substantial weight." 29 C.F.R. § 1601.12(j) (1977).
44. Bowe v. Colgate Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711, 715 (7th Cir. 1969). For a complete
discussion see Belton, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964: A Decade of Private Enforce-
ment and Judicial Developments, 20 ST. Louis U.L.J. 225, 235-40 (1976). Further discussions
of multiple forum problems may be found in the following sources: Hebert and Reischel, supra
note 2; Meltzer, Labor Arbitration and Overlapping and Conflicting Remedies for Employ-
ment Discrimination, 39 U. CI. L. REv. 545 (1967); Peck, Remedies for Racial Discrimination
in Employment: A Comparative Evaluation of Forums, 46 WASH. L. REV. 455 (1971); Sim-
mons, Title VII, the NLRB, and Arbitration: Conflict in National Labor Policy, 5 GA. L. REV.
313 (1971); Beaird, Seventh Annual Labor Law Symposium. Racial Discrimination in Em-
ployment: Rights and Remedies, 6 GA. L. REV. 469, 481-86 (1972); Note, Discrimination in
Employment: Current Federal Practice, 24 DRAKE L. REV. 515, 547-49 (1975); Roth, The
Relationship Between Title VII and the NLRA: "Getting Our Acts Together" in Race Dis-
crimination Cases, 23 VILL. L. REv. 68 (1977).
45. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1976).
46. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.13(a) (1977).
47. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1976).
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EEOC."8 It generally has taken the EEOC two years from the date
of the filing of a charge to complete the investigation and make a
determination." Therefore, by necessity, these time limitations
have not been strictly enforced.
At least four avenues of action exist during the investigative pe-
riod. Following the first avenue, the EEOC may bring suit in federal
district court after a thirty day conciliation period has passed." This
rarely occurs."
The second possibility is the issuance of a right-to-sue letter at
the end of the 180 day investigation time limit. As noted previously,
it is extremely rare for an investigation to be completed and findings
made within the 180 day time limit. When the EEOC has not made
a finding or filed a law suit in federal district court by the end of
this period, Title VII provides that the Commission, on its own
initiative, must notify the complainant of the right to request a
right-to-sue letter.12 A right-to-sue letter is permission for a com-
plainant to file a suit in federal district court. This avenue could be
used very effectively but for the fact that EEOC regulations do not
fully implement the provisions of Title VII. EEOC regulations
depart from the organic statute and provide for notification at the
end of the 180 day period only if it is requested by the complain-
48. It was estimated on April 30, 1977 that the EEOC had a backlog of 130,000 unprocessed
charges. U.S. CIVIL RIGHTS COMM'N., THE FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTs ENFORCEMENT EFFoRT (1977),
supra note 22, at 211. They also cite figures which indicate that the backlog has continuously
risen through the years; on June 30, 1974 the backlog was 98,000; June 30, 1975, 106,700; and
September 30, 1976, 114,200. Id.
The significance of these figures is that the EEOC has not been able to process complaints
in a timely manner. Recent reorganization of the EEOC may hold some hope for reversing
this rising backlog. Id. at 212-13.
49. See H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 61 (1971); Singer, Employment Report:
Internal Problems Hamper EEOC Anti-Bias Effort, 6 NAT'L. J. REP. 1226 (August 17, 1974);
Reiter, On "duplicative employment discriminations actions": a reply to Professor Sullivan,
71 Nw. U. L. REV. 536 (1976); Wall Street Journal, Oct. 22, 1974. at 20, col. 4; Sept. 21, 1976
at 1, col. 5. See also Peck, supra note 21, at 848-49 for a discussion of the backlog problem.
50. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1976).
51. Figures in note 21, supra, show the dismally few number of suits filed by the EEOC
on behalf of individual complainants. Because bringing suit after a thirty day period is only
one way suit may be filed by the Commission on behalf of individuals under § 2000e-5(f)(1),
it follows from these figures that even fewer suits are filed after a thirty day period.
52. [I]f within one hundred and eighty days from the filing of such charge . . .
the Commission has not filed a civil action under this section . . . the Commission
. . . shall so notify the person aggrieved. . . .
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1976).
53. At any time after the expiration of one hundred and eighty (180) days from
the date of the filing of a charge or upon dismissal of a charge at any stage of the
proceedings, an aggrieved person may demand in writing . . . and the Commission
No. 1] 133
ant." The United States Commission on Civil Rights found that
the EEOC's failure to take the initiative to notify complainants of
their right-to-sue denies the judicial alternative to the thousands of
individuals caught up in the EEOC backlog." Furthermore,
this procedure may worsen the judicial situation for both parties
when suit is eventually filed by increasing the time and effort neces-
sary for discovery and creating a likelihood of a greater back pay
award in the event a violation is found to have occurred."
The third avenue of action that could be followed by the EEOC
during the investigatory period is to complete the investigation and
make a finding that there is "no reasonable cause to believe"', that
a violation of Title VII has occurred. Regardless of the EEOC find-
ing, the complainant has a right to a trial de novo in federal district
court." Therefore, upon making the "no reasonable cause" finding,
the Commission must notify the charging party of the right to bring
suit in federal district court within 90 days."8
The fourth alternative is available -when the investigation leads
to a finding of "reasonable cause to believe"" that a Title VII viola-
tion has occurred. Upon making this finding, the EEOC must at-
tempt conciliation of the complaint. 0 The EEOC has no cease-and-
desist powers," so any conciliation agreements are wholly voluntary.
If by some chance a conciliation agreement is reached, the matter
is by definition concluded.
shall promptly issue a notice....
29 C.F.R. § 1601.25b(c) (1977).
54. U.S. CIVIL RIGHTS COMM'N, THE FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT EFFORT 519-21
(1974).
55. U.S. CIVIL RIGHTS COMM'N, THE FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT EFFORT, 1977,
supra note 22, at 209-10.
It will be seen later that this rule has implications beyond the scope of Title VII actions.
One such consequence is that it ultimately dilutes the strength of license renewal challenges
containing allegations of employment discrimination filed by citizens' groups with the Fed-
eral Communications Commission (FCC). The FCC refuses to consider allegations of individ-
ual instances of discrimination alleged in a Petition to Deny until a final decision or judgment
has been reached in the EEOC proceedings. See text at notes 146-182, infra. The shortest
route to a final judicial decision in EEOC proceedings, that of filing suit in federal district
court at the end of 180 days, is not utilized by complainants because they are generally un-
aware that they can do so. Because many EEOC complainants do not take this shortened
procedural route, the FCC citizens' groups' proceedings are also slowed down.
56. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1976); 47 C.F.R. § 1601.57 (1977).
57. See note 28 and accompanying text, supra.
58. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1976).
59. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1976); 47 C.F.R. § 1601.57 (1977).
60. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1976); 47 C.F.R. § 1601.58 (1977).
61. See notes 19-20, supra.
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If conciliation efforts reach an impasse, the EEOC must notify the
charged party 2 and the complainant 3 of failure of conciliation. The
complainant must be further advised that suit may be filed within
90 days in federal district court." If suit is filed, the court, as in any
Title VII action will reach its own independent conclusions in a trial
de novo."5
The EEOC's Failure
From this procedural morass it is fairly easy to distinguish several
reasons for the EEOC's failure to fulfill its legislative purpose.
These reasons have been articulated in numerous articles" concern-
ing the EEOC's failure to live up to its potential and will be dis-
cussed in the order of apparent severity of impact. The most com-
monly cited shortcoming of the EEOC is its failure to exploit the
enforcement powers it gained by Congressional mandate in 1972.7
Although the Commission was denied the authority to issue cease-
and-desist orders, it did gain the power to sue on behalf of individ-
ual complainants. This power has not been fully implemented" and
has led to the broad allegations that the EEOC has "failed to en-
force the law and to extend Title VII to all aspects of industrial
relations.""
Of equal importance is the EEOC's inability to deal effectively
with the large number of individual complaints filed, thereby result-
ing in a tremendous backlog. 0 Several factors have been cited as
reasons for the creation of this backlog. First is the EEOC's policy
of deferring complaints to state fair employment practices agencies
as the forum of first resort." Second is the EEOC's failure to comply
62. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1976); 47 C.F.R. § 1601.25 (1977).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. See note 28, supra.
66. See, e.g., Belton, supra note 44; Peck, supra note 21; COMMISSION REPORT, supra note
11; Hill, supra note 21; Ewald, supra note 1; Singer, supra note 49. Cf. Cooksey, supra note
2; Reiter, supra note 49.
67. See notes 20-21 and accompanying text, supra, for a description of these powers.
68. See Hill, supra note 21, at 83-84; U.S. CIVIL RIGHTS COMM'N., THE FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS
ENFORCEMENT EFFORT 1977, supra note 22, at 176.
69. Hill, supra note 21, at 85.
70. See note 48, supra, regarding the size of the backlog. Hill, supra note 21, at 86-87; U.S.
CIVIL RIGHTS COMM'N., THE FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTs ENFORCEMENT EFFORT, 1977, supra note 22,
at 176; Belton, supra note 44, at 232; Singer, supra note 49, at 1226.
71. The deferral policy has resulted in "delay for charging parties, two investigations for
the respondent, and duplication of the Federal government effort." UNITED STATES COMMIS-




with Title VII and automatically notify complainants of their right
to sue at the end of 180 days.72 Third is simply a lack of coordination
in the processing of claims." Also cited is an overlapping failure to
integrate and use litigation and conciliation as components of a
unified strategy to enforce Title VII.4
Outside of strict procedural difficulties, other forces have been at
work. Both Republican and Democratic administrations have been
accused of denying adequate leadership to the EEOC.6 This has led
to ineffective internal management and deficiencies in organiza-
tional structure." The Commission has been further hampered by
lack of adequate funding to permit the performance of its assigned
tasks."
Beset by such difficulties, it is surprising that the EEOC has ac-
complished anything in the thirteen years following its inception. As
dismal as the situation appears, there is some hope offered by recent
reorganization efforts initiated by the current administration."
Such reorganization includes reordering of the Washington, D.C.
office, consolidation of regional, district and litigation field offices,
and institution of new procedures to expedite handling of both indi-
vidual and pattern and practice complaints. A new standard for the
"reasonable cause to believe" determination has also been insti-
A study released in 1977 by the Center for National Policy Review, State Agencies and their
Role in Federal Civil Rights Enforcement, concluded that the practice of deferring employ-
ment discrimination charges from the EEOC to state fair employment practice commissions
is a failure. According to the study, the EEOC is guilty of "an increasing abdication of federal
civil rights responsibility," while the state agencies are "in a state close to administrative and
procedural chaos." CENTER FOR NATIONAL POLICY REVIEW, STATE AGENCIES AND THEIR ROLES
IN FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT 2, 5 (BNA Summary No. 317, Fair Employment
Practices, April 14, 1977).
72. Singer, supra note 49, at 1226 citing a General Administrative Office (GAO) survey of
July 1974.
73. See notes 48-61 and accompanying text, supra.
74. As an example of this failure, Hill, supra note 21, at 89, which cites the EEOC's failure
to enact regulations that differentiate individual job disputes from institutional discrimina-
tion. It will be seen later that the FCC similarly has failed to make a distinction between
individual complaints of discrimination and the use of individual instances of discrimination
in a license renewal challenge which is an attempt to convince the FCC to grant a hearing
on the license renewal. See notes 142-146 and accompanying text, infra.
75. Hill, supra note 21, at 90.
76. U.S. CIvIL RIGHTS COMM'N, THE FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT EFFORT, 1977,
supra note 22, at 176.
77. Peck, supra note 21, at 848.
78. A description of these efforts is contained within U.S. CIvIL RIGHTS COMM'N, THE
FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT EFFORT, 1977, supra note 22, at 176-242. For a more recent
discussion of the progress of these efforts, see Leach, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and
the EEOC: An Agency in the Midst of Change, 29 MERCER L. REV. 661 (1978).
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tuted." Whether such efforts will be effective remains to be seen.
THE FCC
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) was created as
a regulatory agency by the Communications Act of 1934.0 Under
this act the FCC was granted broad authority to issue broadcast
licenses "if public convenience, interest, or necessity will be served
thereby."8' A license granted under this authority does not become
the property of the broadcast licensee." Instead, the licensee is
granted the license for a three year period 3 and is characterized as
a public trustee." The license must be renewed every three years,
such renewal being contingent upon a finding by the FCC that the
renewal will serve "the public interest, convenience and. necess-
ity."" £
A challenge to the renewal of any license may be made by timely
filing" of a Petition to Deny with the FCC by a party with stand-
ing." A Petition to Deny is, in effect, an application for a hearing
before the Commission. The petition must plead specific allegations
of fact" and the license renewal applicant is then given the oppor-
tunity to file a reply." An evidentiary hearing will be granted only
79. Recommended in memorandum from Alfred W. Blumrosen, Office of the Chair, to
Eleanor Holmes Norton, Chair, EEOC, "Recommendations for Improving the Commission's
Process, Structure and Systemic Programs," July 15, 1977 (revised July 18, 1977) in U.S.
CIVIL RIGHTS COMM'N., THE FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT EFroRT, 1977, supra note 22,
at 225 n.142. See EEOC COMPL. MAN (CCH) § 30.1. "The reasonable cause decision will
constitute a determination that the claim has sufficient merit to warrant litigation if the
matter is not thereafter conciliated. .
80. 47 U.S.C. §§ 141-805 (1934).
81. 47 U.S.C. § 307(a) (1934).
82. 47 U.S.C. § 301 (1976). See, e.g., Ashbacker Radio Corp. v. FCC, 326 U.S. 327 (1945);
FCC v. Sanders Brothers Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470 (1940). In Sanders the court held that
there was no property right for a term inherent in the granting of a broadcast license. They
based their conclusion on the purpose of Chapter 47 of the U.S. Code, such purpose being to
protect the public and not to protect the licensee against competition. Id. at 475.
83. 47 U.S.C. § 307 (d) (1976).
84. Television Corp. of Michigan v. FCC, 294 F.2d 730, 733-34 (D.C. Cir. 1961); McIntire
v. Wm. Penn Broadcasting Co., 151 F.2d 597, 599 (3d Cir. 1945) cert. denied 327 U.S. 779
(1946); FCC v. WOKO, 329 U.S. 223, 229 (1946); Office of Communication of the United
Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994, 1003 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
85. 47 U.S.C. § 307(d) (1976) amending 47 U.S.C. § 307(d) (1934).
86. The petition to deny must be filed no later than 30 days after issuance of a public notice
by the FCC of the acceptance of an application for renewal or before a "cut off" date specified
in the public notice. 47 C.F.R. § 1.580(i) (1977).
87. 47 U.S.C. § 309(d)(1) (1976); 47 C.F.R. § 1.580(i) (1977).




upon presentation of a prima facie case, that is, where a question
of "material and substantial fact" is raised in the pleadings."0
Until 1966, license renewal applications were handled in a rather
perfunctory manner. Standing to file a Petition to Deny was usually
granted only to competing broadcasters." However, in the landmark
United Church of Christ decisions,92 the standing requirement was
significantly expanded to include members of the general listening
public. Subsequent to these decisions, a boom occurred in the num-
ber of listening public members who chose to express their dissatis-
faction with a licensee's performance by filing a Petition to Deny."
90. 47 U.S.C. § 309(e) (1976); 47 C.F.R. §§ 1.591(a), 1.593 (1977). The FCC's definition of
a prima facie case is somewhat idiosyncratic. See text at notes 131-132, infra, for a discussion
of this definition.
91. See, e.g., Ashbacker and Sanders Brothers, supra note 82.
92. Office of the Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994 (D.C.
Cir. 1966); Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 425 F.2d 543
(D.C. Cir. 1969) [hereinafter cited respectively as United Church of Christ I and United
Church of Christ II]. United Church of Christ I was the result of FCC denial of standing to
the Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ in a challenge of the renewal of
the license of WLBT-TV in Jackson, Mississippi, 38 F.C.C. 1143 (1965).
The Office of Communication claimed that they, as members of the listening public, were
a party of interest. The court agreed, ruling that the Commission could not foreclose the
participation of members of the listening public in license renewal proceedings, particularly
since licenses were granted for the benefit of the public. Id. at 1003-1004.
Three years later, a hearing was finally held on the issues presented in the 1965 renewal
challenge. 14 F.C.C.2d 431 (1969). The FCC hearing decision was taken to the federal court
of appeals and the public's right to challenge license renewals was affirmed in United Church
of Christ II, at 544.
93. The following figures illustrate a significant rise in the number of television license
renewal challenges by members of the viewing public since United Church of Christ II in 1969.
Number of television license
Year renewal challenge decisions
19 6 8 . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. .. . .. . .. . . . .. . .. . . .. . . .. .. . .. . . .. .. . . .. .. . .. . 1
1 9 6 9 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1 9 7 0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1 9 7 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1 9 7 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 0
1 9 7 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1 9 7 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1 9 7 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 7
1 9 7 6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 8
1 9 7 7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . 1 4
1978 (to May 12, 1978) . 2
Number of FCC television license renewal challenge decisions (by year of publication) as
found through a survey of all FCC Reports since 1968.
Such license renewal challenges rose steadily through 1975 and from that time the number
has begun to decline. Possible explanations for this phenomenon will be discussed infra in
conjunction with enforcement data regarding the Nondiscrimination Rules.
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Today several grounds exist for challenging the renewal of a
broadcast license. Such grounds include those recognized in the
United Church of Christ I and II decisions: namely, race and reli-
gious discrimination, overcommercialization, and violations of the
Fairness Doctrine." Other frequently used public interest grounds
are programming, 5 concentration of media control," failure to as-
certain community needs" and discriminatory employment prac-
tices."
THE FCC'S JURISDICTION OVER DISCRIMINATORY
EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES
Discriminatory employment practices became a ground for chal-
lenging the renewal of a broadcast license in June of 1969,"1 four
years after the enactment of Title VII by Congress. Employment
discrimination achieved this status via the FCC's action on a peti-
tion for rulemaking initiated by the Office of Communication of the
United Church of Christ.'" The resulting nondiscrimination rules
enunciated a general policy applicable to broadcast licensees which
proscribed discrimination in employment based on "race, color, reli-
gion or national origin.""o' Sex was added as a prohibited basis of
discrimination in 1970.102
The adoption of the EEO Rules was based on several grounds.
The first was the FCC's statutory mandate to regulate "in the pub-
This survey was undertaken by the author as a method of statistically defining problems
which she believed existed in the FCC's enforcement of its EEO Rules. Additional data are
presented at notes 156, 161, infra. The data were extracted from a survey of all FCC Reports
since 1968 and have not been verified by a replicative study so should, therefore, be regarded
as an accurate approximation rather than a definitive study.
94. United Church of Christ I and II, supra note 92.
95. See, e.g., WSM, Inc., 66 F.C.C.2d 994 (1977); General Electric Broadcasting Co. of
Colorado, Inc., 63 F.C.C.2d 96 (1977); Montgomery Independent Telecasters, Inc., 62
F.C.C.2d 309 262 (1976); KIRO, Inc., 58 F.C.C.2d 86 (1976).
96. See, e.g., City of New York Municipal Broadcasting System, 56 F.C.C.2d 169 (1969);
RadiOhio, Inc., and WBNS-TV, Inc., 45 F.C.C.2d 1119 (1974).
97. See, e.g., WSM, Inc., 66 F.C.C.2d 994 (1977); CBS, Inc., 62 F.C.C.2d 262 (1976); Gulf
Television Corp., 58 F.C.C.2d 228 (1976); Mount Hood Radio and Television Broadcasting,
58 F.C.C.2d 288 (1976).
98. See, e.g., WSM, Inc., 66 F.C.C.2d 994 (1977); Roy H. Park Broadcasting of Virginia,
Inc., 66 F.C.C.2d 473 (1977); License Renewal Applications of Certain Broadcast Stations
Licensed For and Serving the State of Colorado, 63 F.C.C.2d 96 (1977); State Telecasting Co.,
Inc., 62 F.C.C.2d 309 (1976); Storer Broadcasting Company, 58 F.C.C.2d 468 (1976).
99. 1969 Rulemaking, supra note 6.
100. Petition filed April 24, 1967 led to the 1968 Rulemaking Proposal, supra note 6.
101. The FCC's general nondiscriminatory policy is embodied in 47 C.F.R. § 73-680 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as EEO Rules].
102. Broadcast Licensee Nondiscrimination, 23 F.C.C.2d 430 (1970).
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lic interest."'"' The national policy to eradicate employment dis-
crimination'04 was recognized as an important factor in ascertaining
whether a broadcaster was operating in the public interest.
[B]roadcasting is an important mass media form which, because
it makes use of the air waves belonging to the public, must obtain
a Federal license under a public interest standard and must oper-
ate in the public interest in order to obtain periodic renewals of
that license. When . . . two considerations are taken together-the
National policy against discrimination and the nature of broad-
casting-we simply do not see how the Commission could make the
public interest finding as to a broadcast applicant who is deliber-
ately pursuing or preparing to pursue a policy of discrimina-
tion-of violating the National policy.'"'
The second basis for the FCC rulemaking lay in its own promul-
gated standards of the public interest. The core of the FCC's public
interest standard lies with the licensee's duty to provide program-
ming that reflects the tastes and viewpoints of all groups within the
community. As a result, all licensees have an obligation to ascertain
the needs and interests of the public they serve'05 by consulting with
community leaders, including spokespersons for minority groups.1or
103. The FCC relied specifically on 47 U.S.C. §§ 5(i), 303, 307, 309 (1934) (1976). 1968
Rulemaking Proposal, supra note 6, at 773, para. 18.
104. The national policy is embodied most notably in the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 18
U.S.C. §§ 2000-2003-15 (1964), as amended 28 U.S.C. H§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1972). Some other
major expressions 8f this policy are: Executive Order 11246, as amended by Executive Order
13375, 3 C.F.R. § 169 (1977), issued in 1965 and 1967 respectively and both relating to
affirmative action by government contractors; The Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. §
206(d)(1); The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621, et seq.
Executive Order 11478, 28 U.S.C. § 2000e, prohibits employment discimination by the
federal government. Other expressions are contained in: Labor Management Relations Act,
29 U.S.C. H§ 141-187 (1947); Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1926). The relatively
recent successful application of one of the Civil War Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, lends
judicial approval to the policy. Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454 (1975)
was the landmark case which established that an action under § 1981 afforded a federal
remedy against employment discrimination. Furthermore, many states have their own fair
employment practices agencies. See generally FAmt EMPLOYMENT PRAcTICES MANUAL 25-28
(BNA 451).
105. 1968 Rulemaking Proposal, supra note-6, at 769. For a discussion see Stanley, Federal
Communications Law and Women's Rights: Women in the Wasteland Fight Back, 23 HAST.
L. J. 15, 36-41 (1971).
The analogy to be drawn in terms of sex discrimination is clear. A station which
discriminates against women in its hiring practices is in violation of federal law and
clearly established commission policy.
Id. at 40.
106. See Commission's En Banc Programming Inquiry, 44 F.C.C. 2303 (1960); 1968 Rule-
making Proposal, supra note 6, at 770.
107. Primer on Ascertainment of Community Problems by Broadcast Applicants, 27




The FCC linked discriminatory employment practices with the
duty to ascertain. The Commission reasoned that if a licensee dis-
criminates against a minority group in his employment practices,
then a substantial question is raised as to the licensee's efforts to
ascertain the needs of that portion of the community:
[A] refusal to hire Negroes or persons of any race or religion
clearly raises a question of whether the licensee is making a good
faith effort to serve the entire public. Thus, it immediately raises
the question of whether he is consulting in good faith with Negro
community leaders concerning programming to serve the area's
needs and interests. Indeed, the very fact of discriminatory hiring
policies may effectively cut the licensee off from success in such
efforts.' 8
There appears to be little question of the FCC's authority to adopt
its EEO Rules.o'0 If the rules were challenged in court, such a chal-
lenge would most likely fail for two reasons. Historically, the courts
have generally deferred to any reasonable interpretation by the FCC
of its public interest standard."0 Secondly, the total context within
which the FCC adopted its EEO Rules provides ample justification
for their adoption. This context includes an acute awareness in the
1960's of widespread discriminatory practices, the destructive ef-
fects of these practices on individuals and the adoption of a nation-
wide policy aimed at correcting this situation. In light of these con-
siderations, the courts would be hard pressed to find the rules to be
beyond the scope of power delegated by Congress in the Communi-
cations Act of 1934."'
108. 1968 Rulemaking Proposal, supra note 6, at 770.
The licensee's specific duties to provide equal employment opportunities and to maintain
an affirmative action program are set forth in 47 C.F.R. § 73.680 (1977).
The FCC's authority to adopt the EEO Rules was supported by the advisory opinion of then
Assistant Attorney General Pollack who concluded: ". . . I consider adoption of the proposed
rule, or one embodying the same principles, a positive step which your Commission appears
to have ample authority to take." Letter of Assistant Attorney General Pollack, supra note
8, at 777.
109. The only party to question the FCC's authority to adopt the EEO Rules were members
of the National Association of Broadcasters (NAB). 1968 Rulemaking Proposal, supra note
6, at 766. Their objection was that "the Commission has not been granted regulatory power
over civil rights and that Congress had delegated this function to the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964." This is the very
argument that the FCC is now using as a rationale for its deferral policy. See discussion at
notes 183-209 infra.
110. See FCC v. RCA Communications, Inc., 346 U.S. 86 (1953); FCC v. Pottsville Broad-
casting Co., 309 U.S. 134 (1940). See generally Paper, Judicial Scrutiny of the FCC: the
Illusion of Usurpation, 52 B.U.L. REv. 659 (1972).
111. See NBC v. Unived States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943); Stahlman v. FCC, 126 F.2d 124 (D.C.
Cir. 1942); Red River Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 98 F.2d 282 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied 305 U.S.
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In adopting its EEO Rules, the FCC went only so far as to talk
about the national policy against discrimination. The national pol-
icy is embodied in law in numerous forms"' so that a violation of
the national policy against discrimination may also give rise to a
violation of federal law. Since a violation of the law is more discrete
and easily defined than is a violation of a general policy, if the FCC
is willing to make a finding that a broadcaster who violates the
public policy is not operating in the public interest by violating
public policy then a violation of a federal law relating to discrimina-
tion in employment should be an even more apparent breach of the
public interest standard.
The FCC, however, chose to address only the more nebulous na-
tional policy issue. It expressly failed to concern itself with the effect
a violation of federal anti-discrimination laws by a broadcaster
would have on the license renewal process. They proceeded, instead,
to formulate a vague standard which appears to have shifted consis-
tently to the detriment of citizens' groups interested in challenging
license renewals on the ground of employment discrimination."'
In its 1968 Rulemaking Proposal, the FCC implied that it would
not grant a license renewal if it received a petition or complaint that
raised substantial issues of fact concerning discrimination in em-
ployment practices, if "the matter is of such a serious nature as to
call into question the basic grant of operating authority.""' The
FCC's general requirement that allegations in the Petition to Deny
be specific and raise questions of "material and substantial fact""'
applied inclusively to allegations of employment discrimination. In
these allegations the challenger must demonstrate with specificity
that the licensee's employment practices either prevented equal
employment opportunities or that the licensee discriminated in
employment."' To demonstrate these ultimate facts with specific-
625 (1938). See also Paper, supra note 110, at 665.
112. See note 104, supra, for a listing of some of the more important federal laws relating
to discrimination in employment.
113. Note, Implementation of Equal Employment Opportunity by the Independent Regu-
latory Commissions through the Power to Act in the Public Interest: Two Divergent Views,
17 WM. AND MARY L. REV. 332, 353-54 (1975).
114. 1968 Rulemaking Proposal, supra note 6, at 771. Similarly, upon the adoption of the
EEO Rules in 1969 it was stated: ". . . renewal will not be appropriate where there is a
pattern of substantial failure to accord equal employment opportunities." 1969 Rulemaking,
supra note 6, at 242.
115. 47 U.S.C. § 309(d)(1) (1976); 47 C.F.R. § 1.584 (1977).
116. See, e.g., Time-Life Broadcasting, Inc., 33 F.C.C.2d 1050, 1059 (1972); Columbia
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ity, the FCC requires a showing of either "specific instances of dis-
crimination or a conscious policy of exclusion.""'
Two general categories of problems have subsequently arisen in
the application of this requirement. First is the FCC's policy regard-
ing the weight accorded statistical evidence of discrimination." The
second is the FCC's policy of deferring action on a Petition to Deny
containing allegations of individual instances of discrimination,
where complaints based on those allegations have been filed with
the EEOC, until a final EEOC result."' The negative results of this
second policy have been confounded by the FCC's practice of essen-
tially ignoring EEOC determinations once they are obtained,2o or
using more recent employment figures to rebut the determination. 2'
The remainder of this note will be concerned primarily with the
results of the deferral policy. A brief overview of the problems cre-
Broadcasting System, Inc., 46 F.C.C.2d 903, 918 (1974); Newhouse Broadcasting Corp., 53
F.C.C.2d 966, 978 (1975); American Broadcasting Co., Inc., 53 F.C.C.2d 1065, 1069 (1975).
117. Bilingual Bicultural Coalition of Mass Media, Inc. v. FCC, 492 F.2d 656, 659 (D.C.
Cir. 1974).
118. See notes 123-41 and accompanying text, infra.
119. The deferral policy was first set forth in the 1968 Rulemaking Proposal, supra note 6,
at 772. It was primarily addressed, however, to individual complaints of discrimination filed
with the FCC at any time throughout the license term. Its main thrust seemed to be that of
providing a forum for redress of individual complaints that were not eligible to be filed with
the EEOC or state fair employment practices commissions because the employer did not have
the requisite number of employees. The EEOC at that time would accept only complaints
regarding employers with 25 or more employees.
Where substantial complaints are lodged against stations which, due to the small
number of their personnel or the absence of state legislation, fall under neither
Federal nor State civil rights provisions, the Commission will act upon these com-
plaints. . . .
1968 Rulemaking Proposal, supra note 6, at 772.
The Commission failed to clearly distinguish filed complaints and instances of discrimina-
tion used to specifically allege discriminatory employment practices in the pleadings of a
license renewal challenge. The closest they came to addressing this question was almost an
afterthought:
Insofar as this aspect of the matter is concerned, action on a major application
would await resolution of the referral: if the results of the liaison indicate that there
is a substantial issue, the application will be designated for hearing.
Id. at 772, para. 15(i).
Curiously, the FCC did not implement this deferral policy until more than 6 years after it
was first adopted. When they did choose to implement it, it was within a different context.
This is discussed in depth in text accompanying notes 142-49, infra.
120. See, e.g., NBC, Inc., 52 F.C.C.2d 273 (1975); 57 F.C.C.2d 668 (1976); 58 F.C.C.2d 419
(1976), aff'd sub nom. National Organization for Women v. FCC, 555 F.2d 1002 (D.C. Cir.
1977).
121. See, e.g., Palmetto Radio Corp., 58 F.C.C.2d 1104 (1976); Springfield Television




ated by the weight accorded statistical evidence of discrimination'22
will first be presented in order to place the deferral policy in
perspective.
THE FCC'S POLICY REGARDING WEIGHT
ACCORDED EMPLOYMENT STATISTICS
The weight given to employment statistics in license renewal pro-
ceedings has remained consistent since the FCC first enunciated
its policy in 19688 and attempted to clarify it in 1970.24
We have at no time indicated that fully proportional employment
of minority groups is called for by our rules, since we do not believe
that fair employment practices will necessarily result in the em-
ployment of any minority group in direct proportion to its.mem-
bers in the community.125
This rather vague, negatively stated "standard" was only slightly
clarified in 1971 when the court in Stone v. FCCl26 indicated that
only a "highly disproportional representation of minorities or
women employed by a licensee in relation to their presence in the
work force would constitute prima facie evidence of discriminatory
practices."'" With this statement, the court affirmed the FCC's use
of the "zone of reasonableness" standard. 28 Essentially, this stan-
122. For more thorough examinations of this issue see Note, FCC Failure to Eradicate
Employment Discrimination by Broadcast Licensees, 21 ST. Louis U.L.J. 150 (1977);
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 11, at 132-34; Note, The FCC's Role in Providing Equal
Employment Opportunity for Minority Groups, supra note 2, at 669-72; Bowie & Whitehead,
A Study of the Federal Communications Commission's Equal Employment Opportunity
Regulation-An Agency in Search of a Standard, 5 BLAcK L.J. 313 (1978), available also in
xerox form from the Citizens Communication Center, Washington, D.C. (April 1976).
123. 1968 Rulemaking Proposal, supra note 6, at 771. The FCC indicated that the mere
presentation of statistical evidence showing that the number of women and minorities em-
ployed by a station were lower than their number in the broadcast area of the station would
not raise "a substantial question of discrimination."
124. Broadcast Licensee Nondiscrimination, 23 F.C.C.2d 430 (1970). This attempt at clari-
fication occurred in conjunction with the FCC's adoption of Form 395 for the annual reporting
of employment statistics by licensees. The FCC's treatment of categories in Form 395 pro-
vides slightly modified employment categories from the EEO-1 forms used by the EEOC and
the Department of Labor, Office of Contract Compliance. In the 1970 rulemaking, the FCC
considered totally modifying the categories to make them more meaningful to the broadcast
industry. Citing reluctance to require stations to give parallel information in different form,
they retained the old categories. Id. at 432. It was these EEO-1 categories which led to the
"misleading" statistics cited by the Civil Rights Commission in COMMIssION REPORT, supra
note 11, at 148 (1977).
125. Broadcast Licensee Nondiscrimination, supra note 124, at 431 (1970).
126. Evening Star Broadcasting Co., 27 F.C.C.2d 316 (1971), aff'd sub nom. Chuck Stone
v. FCC, 466 F.2d 316, 322, reh. denied 466 F.2d 331 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
127. Id. at 322.
128. Id. at 322. This standard has been reaffirmed in subsequent court cases. See Bilingual
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dard is a non-static concept in which minority employment that is
disproportionate to the ratio of the same minority in the broadcast
area can be within the "zone of reasonableness" if the licensee is
practicing affirmative action recruitment.'2 9
In its 1970 rulemaking,13 0 the FCC further assured broadcasters
that although it would require the yearly submission of employ-
ment statistics in Form 395, such statistics alone would not be de-
terminative of the issue of employment discrimination. 3 ' The FCC
has firmly maintained its position that statistics alone do not
compromise a prima facie case of employment discrimination."3
Bicultural Coalition of Mass Media, Inc., supra note 117, at 658-59; Columbus Broadcasting
Coalition v. FCC, 505 F.2d 320 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
129. The FCC has consistently relied upon this standard in finding that a licensee is in
compliance with its EEO Rules notwithstanding a large disproportion of minority employees.
See, e.g., WCSC, Inc., 61 F.C.C.2d 570 (1976); Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., 57 F.C.C.2d
377 (1976); Rust Craft Broadcasting of New York, Inc., 54 (F.C.C.2d 1222 (1975); Capital
Cities Broadcasting, 55 F.C.C.2d 553 (1975); Universal Communications Corp., 56 F.C.C.2d
445 (1975); General Electric Broadcasting Co. of Colorado, Inc., 63 F.C.C. 748 (1977).
That the definition of the standard is unsatisfactory is admitted by certain members of the
Commission:
[I] would hope that this Commission will, at the earliest possible moment, develop
and enunciate a recognizable "zone of reasonableness" standard which will spell
out as clearly and straightforwardly as possible exactly what we expect of licensees
in this area. . . . I fail to understand where any constructive purpose is served by
continuing to apply some sort of amorphous rule of thumb to these matters.
Concurring Statement of Commissioner James H. Quello, Nondiscrimination of Licensees
Employment Practices, 54 F.C.C.2d 354, 374 (1975).
130. Broadcast Licensee Nondiscrimination, 23 F.C.C.2d 430 (1970).
131. Id. at 431. This was emphasized again in Broadcast Licensee Nondiscrimination, 54
F.C.C.2d 354, 361 paras. 22, 23 (1975) and in Broadcast Licensee Nondiscrimination, 60
F.C.C.2d 226, 242, para. 41 (1976).
In the 1976 rulemaking the Commission stressed that "reasonable representation" of mi-
nority groups was its tool for evaluation of broadcasters' progress in providing equal employ-
ment opportunities. They indicated that the broadcaster was to use the standard of
"substantial incongruence" in the proportion of women and minorities in a station's work-
force as a tool of self-analysis for licensees in evaluating the effectiveness of their EEO
programs.
What we are seeking is a good faith analysis on the part of each broadcast licensee
so that it recognizes any shortcomings in its EEO program and takes corrective
steps to eliminate any defects prior to the Commission's evaluation of the program.
Therefore, we did not intend to intimidate licensees. . . .
Id. at 237.
It is interesting to note that in this 1976 rulemaking, the FCC further rescinded its
commitment to help remedy employment discrimination when it stated: "We do not contend
that this agency has a sweeping mandate to further the national policy against discrimina-
tion." Id. at 229-30.
132. Challenge after challenge, the FCC has refused to grant a hearing based upon statis-
tics alone. See, e.g., Capitol Cities Communications, Inc., 58 F.C.C.2d 13 (1976); License
Renewal Applications of Certain Broadcast Stations Licensed For and Serving the State of
Louisiana, 60 F.C.C.2d 655 (1976); Newhouse Broadcasting, 61 F.C.C.2d 528 (1976); Flower
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Thus, if only a strong statistical showing of discrimination is made,
a hearing will not be granted on that basis.
If statistics alone do not make a prima facie showing, the question
remains as to what will. The FCC has a somewhat idiosyncratic
method of determining that a prima facie showing has been made.
Contrary to civil litigation in which a prima facie case may be
established solely on the basis of plaintiffs pleadings, the FCC de-
termines whether a prima facie case has been made by considering
a total configuration consisting of the renewal application, the
pleadings of both the challenger and the broadcast applicant and
"other matters of which it may take official notice."'3 3 In this pro-
cess, the FCC seems to accord great deference to the licensee's
pleadings, exhibiting what the court in United Church of Christ II
described as a "curious neutrality-in favor- of-the-licensee."'"3 If the
FCC decides that the licensee's pleadings adequately rebut the
challenger's, no prima facie case has been established and no evi-
dentiary hearing will be granted. Generally, in order for a licensee's
pleadings to adequately rebut the challenger's, the licensee must
show only that his current employment figures fall within the "zone
of reasonableness" and that an affirmative action plan is on file.'3 1
City Television Corp., 57 F.C.C.2d 112 (1976); Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., Inc., 53
F.C.C.2d 702 (1975); WHEC, Inc., 52 F.C.C.2d 1079 (1975); Westinghouse Broadcasting, Co.,
Inc., 48 F.C.C.2d 1123 (1974).
133. See Chuck Stone v. FCC, supra note 126, at 321-22 and NBC, Inc., 58 F.C.C.2d 419,
420 n.4 (1976) for a description of this process.
134. United Church of Christ II, supra note 92, at 547 (1969). The court continues to
describe Commission function in this fashion. See Black Broadcasting Coalition v. FCC, 556
F.2d 59, 65 (1977).
135. See, e.g., Storer Broadcasting Co., 41 F.C.C.2d 792, 815 paragraph 55 (1973); Ameri-
can Broadcasting Co., Inc., 47 F.C.C.2d 960, 971-72 (1974); Complaint of Puerto Rican Media
Action and Educational Council, Inc. et al against Educational Broadcasting Corp., 51
F.C.C.2d 1178 (1975); American Broadcasting Co., Inc., 52 F.C.C.2d 98 (1975); Newhouse
Broadcasting Corp., 53 F.C.C.2d 966 (1975); 1972 License Renewal Applications for 17 Broad-
cast Facilities Licensed to the Richmond, Va. area, 54 F.C.C.2d 953, 957-58 (1975); Capitol
Cities Broadcasting, 55 F.C.C.2d 553 (1975); The Hearst Corporation, 59 F.C.C.2d 467; Mont-
gomery Independent Telecasters, Inc., 62 F.C.C.2d 262 (1976).
It should be noted that the FCC also promulgated rules requiring licensees to adopt affirm-
ative action programs to eliminate discrimination in their employment practices. 1969 Rule-
making, supra note 6, at 242. For this purpose all licensees with more than 5 employees are
required to file annual statistical reports in Form 395. Broadcast Licensees Nondiscrimi-
nation, supra note 125, at 436 (1970). A copy of the affirmative action plan must be filed as
part of the license renewal application. Broadcast Licensee Nondiscrimination, supra note
125, at 436 and Nondiscrimination in the Employment Practices of Licensees, 60 F.C.C.2d
220 (1976).
A serious question has arisen as to the sufficiency of the requirements put upon the licen-
sees' affirmative action plans. The primary criticism of these requirements is that the plans
are not required to be result-oriented and are merely a recitation of the broad principle that
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It is extremely difficult to establish with specificity that the licen-
see's employment statistics do not fall within the "zone of reasona-
bleness", because discovery is not allowed until a formal hearing is
granted.3 The employment statistics in the Form 395's are avail-
able, as public information, for framing the pleadings,' but more
detailed and recent employment information is not available to the
challenger until discovery can be made. The licensee, of course, has
access to this data, which is a significant advantage over the chal-
lengers.
The FCC rarely finds that a prima facie showing has been made
by the challenger.'3 1 If they do, however, a hearing may be granted
the licensee promises he won't discriminate. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTs, THE FEDERAL CIVIL
RIGHTs ENFORCEMENT EFFoRT-1974. Volume I, To Regulate in the Public Interest, at 15.
The FCC confirms this criticism when it states that all it requires is that the station
perform a "good faith analysis" of the EEO program. Broadcast Licensee Nondiscrimination,
60 F.C.C.2d 226, 237 (1976). This has enabled the FCC to ignore lack of results in the
program. Instead, they merely confirm that the broadcaster. has a program and drop the
matter. U.S. CIVIL RIGHTs COMM'N., THE FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT EFFORT-1974,
supra at 15.
136. Amendment of Discovery Rules, 11 F.C.C.2d 185, 187 (1968). But see, Bilingual Bicul-
tural Coalition v. FCC, supra note 117. The FCC, in general, has not complied with the court's
holding in Bilingual which was that unless the Commission provided some means for a
petitioner to discover prior to hearing, the FCC might be required to grant hearings based
on statistical disparities in the pleadings in order to afford a challenger an opportunity for
discovery. Id. at 659. In Boadcast Licensee Nondiscrimination, supra note 131 (1976), the
FCC proceeded as if the Bilingual holding had never occurred, detailed the steps taken when
a licensee's employment practices appear substandard, and stated that "it may be necessary
. . . to order a hearing . . . but . . . [wie trust that most cases will not proceed to such
extremes." Id. at 230.
The practice of not allowing pre-hearing discovery has been widely criticized. See, e.g.,
Note, FCC Failure to Eradicate Employment Discrimination by Broadcast Licensees, supra
note 122, at 157-58; U.S. COMM'N ON Cwn. RIGHTS, THE FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTs ENFORCEMENT
EFFOrT-1974, 222-225 (1974).
Bilingual Bicultural Coalition v. FCC, 3 Med. L. Rptr. 2233 (D.C. Cir, May 4, 1978)
clarified this situation somewhat. The court held that an FCC refusal to grant discovery or
to conduct its own inquiry and make findings as to reasons for the employment disparity
and then to renew the KONO-TV license for a three year term subject only to future monitor-
ing constituted an abuse of discretion. Id. at 2241-42. The court then refused to order
discovery but remanded the issue to the Commission for a factual determination, indicating
that if such a determination could not be made, the FCC must hold a hearing. Id. at 2242.
With this decision, the court ordered what dissenting commissioner Nicholas Johnson recom-
mended in 1971. 31 F.C.C.2d 413, 424 (1971).
137. One finding of the COMMIssIoN REPORT, supra note 11, at 148 was that the employment
categories in the Form 395 which were "borrowed" from EEO-1 forms used by the EEOC and
Office of Federal Contract Compliance, have never been tailored to the broadcast industry
and provide insufficient and inaccurate information.
138. Two television license renewal challenges containing complaints of employment dis-
crimination have led to a hearing: Alabama Educational Television Commission, 33 F.C.C.2d
495 (1972), hearing conducted in September 1974; New Mexico Broadcasting, Inc., 54
F.C.C.2d 126 (1975). In both cases the hearing was granted on more than just the EEO
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at which time the Commission will make a more thorough examina-
tion of the station's employment practices. But even if the Commis-
sion concludes from the pleadings that a prima facie case of em ploy-
ment discrimination has been established, a hearing will not be
granted on that basis alone.'" This unwillingness to grant a hearing
based solely on a prima facie showing of employment discrimination
is demonstrated by the FCC practice of granting a conditional li-
cense renewal to broadcasters who have poor employment figures or
an inadequate affirmative action program."" The renewal is usually
conditioned upon a subsequent showing of improved employment
figures by the broadcaster, the formulation of an acceptable affirm -
ative action program, and/or documentation of more contacts with
community groups for ascertainment purposes."'
FCC DEFERRAL OF ACTION PENDING FINAL EEOC
OUTCOME
Another policy involving conditional renewal has been used by
the FCC with increasing frequency since 1975. This policy entails a
deferral of final action on the license renewal application until a
final EEOC outcome is obtained on any individual instance of dis-
ground. Alabama's grounds were programming, ascertainment and equal employment oppor-
tunities. New Mexico's were programming and equal employment opportunities.
A hearing was granted in Roy H. Park Broadcasting of Va., Inc., 66 F.C.C.2d 473 (1977)
pursuant to an order on remand from federal district court. Black Broadcasting Coalition of
Richmond v. FCC, 556 F.2d 59 (D.C.Cir. 1977), reh. denied, June 17, 1977, as amended on
denial of rehearing, June 20, 1977. A full hearing was ordered on allegations of discrimination
and on licensee's affirmative action efforts; ascertainment aspects were remanded for Com-
mission determination as to whether a hearing is required. A hearing was denied previously.
54 F.C.C.2d 995 (1975).
139. See Alabama Educational Television Comm'n and New Mexico Broadcasting, Inc.,
supra note 138, where a hearing was granted on several bases.
140. See, e.g., WSM, Inc., 66 F.C.C.2d 994 (1977); License Renewal Applications of Certain
Broadcast Stations Licensed For and Serving the State of Colorado, 63 F.C.C.2d 96 (1977);
State Telecasting Co., Inc., 62 F.C.C.2d 309 (1976); Mount Hood Radio and Television
Broadcasting, 58 F.C.C.2d 288 (1976); Capitol Cities Communications, Inc., 58 F.C.C.2d 13
(1976); WSCS, Inc., 61 F.C.C.2d 570 (1976); License Renewal Applications of Certain Broad-
cast Stations Licensed for and Serving the State of Louisiana, 60 F.C.C.2d 655 (1976); Univer-
sal Communications Corp., 56 F.C.C.2d 445 (1975); Cosmos Broadcasting of Louisiana, Inc.,
56 F.C.C.2d 320 (1975); City of New York Municipal Broadcasting System, 56 F.C.C.2d 169
(1975); Metromedia, Inc., 55 F.C.C.2d 609 (1975); Rust Craft Broadcasting of New York, Inc.,
54 F.C.C.2d 1222 (1975); 1972 License Renewal Applications for 18 Broadcast Stations Li-
censed to the Washington, D.C. Area, 54 F.C.C.2d 599 (1975); 222 Television, Inc., 53
F.C.C.2d 656 (1975); Louisiana Television Broadcasting Corp., et al, 53 F.C.C.2d 561 (1975);
1972 License Renewal Applications for 28 Broadcast Facilities Licensed in the Philadalphia,
Pa. Area, 53 F.C.C.2d 104 (1975).
141. Id. See generally Note, 17 WM. & MARY L. REv. 332, 355-356 (1975).
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crimination alleged in the challenger's Petition to Deny. Such a
deferral of action entails the temporary renewal of the broadcast
license, with its final renewal conditioned upon the outcome of the
EEOC proceedings.
History
The basis for the FCC's deferral policy lay with Assistant Attor-
ney General Pollack's admonishment to the FCC in 1968 that with
the adoption of their EEO Rules, they should seek to avoid duplica-
tion of effort.'42 As a result, the 1968 Rulemaking Proposal incorpo-
rated a policy that the FCC allow individual complaints of discrimi-
nation to be filed with them, but defer all complaints that could
appropriately be lodged with other agencies to those agencies."'
Thus, initially the deferral policy was intended to divert all individ-
ual employment discrimination complaints to other agencies, ex-
cept those of a very narrowly defined group of individuals who
worked for broadcasters lacking the requisite number of employees
to fall within the EEOC's jurisdiction."' The FCC indicated that in
allowing individual complaints to be filed with it, it was merely
attempting to provide an avenue of redress for those individuals
not otherwise qualified under other statutory and regulatory pro-
vision."'
Evolution of the Current Deferral Policy
In 1975, the FCC began to implement its deferral policy in a
rather unusual manner. Deferral came to mean an indefinite delay
of action on license renewal challenges instead of a mere channeling
142. Letter of Assistant Attorney General Pollack, 1969 Rulemaking Proposal, supra note
8, at 777. It should be noted that when Pollack warned the FCC to avoid duplication of effort,
he recommended in the same sentence that the FCC and EEOC should make arrangements
to work together toward that end. Id. Such cooperation has never occurred.
143. 1968 Rulemaking Proposal, supra note 6, at 772.
144. Title VII applies to employer with 15 or more employees. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1976).
The FCC's nondiscrimination rules apply to broadcasters with 10 or more employees, al-
though complaints are deferred to the EEOC where deemed appropriate. Therefore, the FCC
will receive individual employment discrimination complaints regarding employers with 10-
15 employees.
145. While showing a willingness to provide this avenue of redress, the Commission did not
address the issue of what remedies would be available to eligible complainants:
Where substantial complaints are lodged against stations which due to the small
number of their personnel or the absence of State legislation, fall under neither
Federal nor State civil rights provisions, the Commission itself will act upon these
complaints in accord with the [ir] . . . stated policy.
1968 Rulemaking Proposal, supra note 6, at 772, para. 15(iii).
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of individual complaints to the appropriate agency. This shift in
meaning is illustrated quite clearly in an infamous series of FCC and
court decisions relating to the license renewal application of WRC-
TV in Washington, D.C.'" In this challenge, the FCC deferred final
action on the license renewal application of WRC-TV, granting an
interim conditional renewal until a final result could be obtained on
the EEOC complaint filed by 27 individuals who were cited as spe-
cific instances of discrimination in the Petition to Deny. 47
The EEOC had already determined on the basis of the statistical
evidence that there was reasonable cause to believe that WRC-TV
had discriminated in its employment practices."' The FCC refused
to consider the EEOC determination as evidence of the broad-
caster's discriminatory employment practices, stating that they
would consider the matter to determine compliance with their own
requirements regarding equal employment opportunities. 48 The ef-
fect of this decision is to institute a policy of ignoring the EEOC
determination, although the alleged purpose of delaying action on
the matter was to await the EEOC outcome.
The FCC related this policy to situations in which negotiated
conciliation has failed and no judicial proceedings have been insti-
tuted.1r" They then stated that "should the matter remain pending
in the EEOC or before a court, applicants will be required to keep
the Commission advised of the final outcome of these proceed-
ings."'" This implies that if a "reasonable cause to believe" deter-
mination is made by the EEOC and the court action commences or
has commenced, the FCC will wait for the court action to be com-
pleted, which frequently takes years, before they will make a final
determination in their own proceedings. Thus, even though court
146. National Broadcasting Co., Inc., 52 F.C.C.2d 273 (1975); 57 F.C.C.2d 668 (1976); 58
F.C.C.2d 419 (1976), aff'd. sub nom. NOW v. FCC, 555 F.2d 1002 (D.C. Cir. 1977)
[hereinafter cited as NBC, Inc.].
The initial FCC decision to defer in 52 F.C.C.2d 273 was made on the basis of an already
existing EEOC "reasonable cause to believe" determination. When the EEOC conciliation
process came to an impasse, the FCC was then unable to make a decision on the allegations
of employment discrimination based on updated employment information from WRC, and
for that reason decided to inquire further into the station's employment practices. 57
F.C.C.2d 668, 669 (1976). After the inquiry, the license was renewed. 58 F.C.C.2d 419 (1976).
It was in this decision that the FCC explicitly stated their deferral policy. The court subse-
quently upheld the FCC decision.
147. 52 F.C.C.2d 273, 292 (1975).
148. See note 146, supra.
149. 52 F.C.C.2d 273, 292 para. 71 (1975).
150. Id.
151. Id. at 293 para. 71.
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action proceeds independently of the EEOC agency proceedings, the
FCC will not consider the reasonable cause determination to be the
final result of the EEOC proceedings.
The decision in NBC, Inc. may be strongly criticized for two
reasons. First, by deferring action on the discrimination issue in the
license renewal challenge, the FCC implemented the deferral policy
as though the 27 individuals had filed a charge with only the EEOC.
The license renewal challenge pending before the FCC was filed by
a citizens' group, the National Organization for Women (NOW), in
order to obtain a hearing based partially upon a showing of 27 spe-
cific instances of discrimination. Thus, the individuals cited in the
petition were not seeking redress through the FCC, but were being
used as evidence of discriminatory employment practices as a basis
for challenging the broadcaster's license renewal application.
Secondly, the FCC's decision that an EEOC determination is not
final and should therefore carry little weight in the FCC proceedings
is incongruous with its rationale for the adoption of its EEO
Rules.'" When the FCC adopted the EEO Rules it indicated that
a violation of the national policy against employment discrimina-
tion by a broadcaster would preclude the Commission from finding
the broadcaster's license renewal application to be in the public
interest.'53 Yet, when the EEOC found "reasonable cause to believe"
that individuals were discriminated against under a law' 4 manifest-
ing the national policy, the FCC effectively maintained that these
findings were not sufficiently final to carry weight in the FCC pro-
ceedings. This new version of the FCC's deferral policy has enabled
the Commission to evade employment discrimination issues." Fol-
lowing the NBC, Inc. decision, the FCC has zealously applied the
deferral policy to instances involving complainants still awaiting an
EEOC determination and instances where an EEOC determination
has been obtained.'"
152. See text accompanying notes 102-05 supra.
153. See note 105, supra.
154. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. H§ 2000e-2000e-15 (1964), as
amended 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1976).
155. For discussions see COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 11, at 134-35; Note, Petitioning
to Deny Broadcast License Renewals, 16 WASHBURN L.J. 375, 392-93 (1977); U.S. CIVIL RIGHTS
COMMISSION, THE FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT EFFoRT-1974, supra note 135, at 27-
31.
156. The following is a list of license renewal challenges in which deferral occurred on one
of the two grounds: 1972 License Renewal Applications for 18 Broadcast Stations Licensed
in the Washington, D.C. Area, 54 F.C.C.2d 599 (1975); Miami Valley Broadcasting Corp., 56
F.C.C.2d 399 (1975); National Broadcasting Co., Inc., 56 F.C.C.2d 411 (1975); Universal
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Because of its tremendous backlog of complaints, it takes the
EEOC at least two years to make a determination on a complaint."'
Consequently, even if the EEOC determination were seen as a final
decision, FCC deferral of action on a Petition to Deny could result
in a delay of at least two years, depending, of course, upon when the
EEOC complaint was filed. Moreover, following the NBC, Inc. deci-
sion, the FCC effectively ignores the EEOC determination as a final
decision. The implication is that only a conciliation agreement' or
federal court decision will suffice as a final decision, thereby extend-
ing the time lapse during the FCC deferral. Thus, when a broadcast
license is temporarily renewed contingent upon a final EEOC out-
come, a full three year licensure period may pass and the licensee
may be well into another licensure period before the final EEOC
outcome is known. 59
When the FCC prescribed an evidentiary standard by which li-
cense renewal challengers could make a prima facie showing of em-
Communications Corp., 56 F.C.C.2d 445 (1975); KCOP Television, Inc., 57 F.C.C.2d 227
(1976); CBS, Inc., 57 F.C.C.2d 505 (1976); Palmetto Radio Corp., 58 F.C.C.2d 1104 (1976);
Newhouse Broadcasting Corp., 59 F.C.C.2d 218 (1976); Golden West Broadcasters, 59
F.C.C.2d 459 (1976); KSD/KSD-TV, Inc., 61 F.C.C.2d 504 (1976); Newhouse Broadcasting,
61 F.C.C.2d 528 (1976); Mount Hood Radio and Television Broadcasting, 58 F.C.C.2d 288
(1976); New York Times Broadcasting Service, Inc., 63 F.C.C.2d 695 (1977); General Electric
Broadcasting Co. of Colorado, Inc., 63 F.C.C.2d 748 (1977); License Renewal Applications of
Certain Broadcast Stations Licensed For and Serving the State of Colorado, 63 F.C.C.2d 96
(1976); WSM, Inc., 66 F.C.C.2d 994 (1977).
From the writer's study, at note 92 supra, the following statistics emerge following the
original NBC decision to defer in 1975.
Number of Number/ Number/
TV license percent percent
renewal deferred to conditionally
Date challenges await EEO renewed-to see
decision with EEO agency new data from
adopted grounds outcome the station
1975 37 21 = 57% 9 = 24%
1976 18 6 = 33% 6 = 33%
1977 6 5 = 83% 2 = 33%
1978 2 0 0
(to May 12, 1978)
TOTAL 63 32 = 51% 17 = 27%
157. See text at note 49 supra.
158. The FCC considers a negotiated conciliation to be evidence of an intent to comply
with their rules and policies. 52 F.C.C.2d 273, 292 para. 11 (1975).
159. Television licenses must be renewed every three years. See text at note 84 supra. If
an EEOC complaint was filed shortly before the license renewal date and a final decision was
not obtained on that complaint for three and a half or four years, as is not uncommon, another
renewal date will already have passed.
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ployment discrimination (viz, a requirement of specific instances of
discrimination),' this action appeared to manifest the Commis-
sion's recognition of their responsibility to confront the problem of
employment discrimination in the broadcast industry. Having es-
tablished this opportunity for redress, the FCC turned its back
on the problem under the guise of deferral for avoidance of duplica-
tion. A standard of proof was created and license renewal challeng-
ers arose to meet that standard, but the opportunity for the chal-
lengers effectively to utilize this forum has been defeated by an
irrational policy of delay.'6 ' Metromedia, Inc.'" represents the appli-
cation of the FCC deferral policy prior to an EEOC determination.
NBC, Inc.,8 3 of course, stands for deferral notwithstanding an
EEOC "reasonable, cause to believe" determination.
Deferral before the EEOC Determination:
Metromedia, Inc.
When an individual complaint is pending before the EEOC at the
same time that the complainant is cited as a specific instance of
discrimination in a Petition to Deny, the FCC generally will defer
160. See Bilingual Bicultural, supra note 117. See text accompanying note 117, supra.
161. See NBC, Inc., supra note 146. The writer's survey indicates that individual instances
were raised in the following number and percent of television license renewal challenges.
Total Number of challenges




decision with EEO instances of
adopted grounds discrimination Percent
1968 0 0 0
1969 0 0 0
1970 0 0 0
1971 5 0 0
1972 11 3 27
1973 3 0 0
1974* 5 2 40
1975 37 21 57
1976 18 8 44
1977** 7 6 86
1978 2 0 0
(to May 12)
*Bilingual Bicultural was decided in federal court of appeals.
**NOW v. FCC (NBC, Inc.) was decided in federal court of appeals.
162. 57 F.C.C.2d 277 (1975).
163. NBC, Inc., supra note 146.
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action on the employment discrimination portion of the Petition."'
In doing so, it will order the licensee to keep the Commission ad-
vised of the final outcome of these proceedings.'" In Metromedia,
Inc.,'" the Los Angeles Women's Coalition for Better Broadcasting
(LAWCBB) cited the situation of Ms. Violet Lo Presto as a specific
instance of discrimination in a Petition to Deny. Ms. Lo Presto had
filed an employment discrimination complaint with the EEOC
three years prior to the filing of the LAWCBB's Petition to Deny,
but she had not received a determination on the EEOC complaint.
Not surprisingly, the FCC deferred action on the LAWCBB's Peti-
tion to Deny pending the outcome of Ms. Lo Presto's proceedings.'
There were several reasons for the three year delay in the proceed-
ings on Ms. Lo Presto's complaint before the EEOC. First, Califor-
nia has a state agency, the Fair Employment Practices Commission
(FEPC), to serve as the forum of first resort.' In an exercise of the
EEOC's deferal policy, Ms. Lo Presto's complaint was first sent to
the FEPC, resulting in a delay of at least 60 days before the comm-
encement of EEOC jurisdiction.' Secondly, Ms. Lo Presto most
likely was unaware of her right to demand a right-to-sue letter from
the EEOC 180 days after they gained jurisdiction. 0 If she had
known this, she could have pursued the shorter route to a decision
in a Title VII case, that of filing suit in federal district court. Ms.
Lo Presto conceivably could have had a court decision by the time
the Petition to Deny was filed with the FCC.
Because the EEOC had not made a final determination on the
complaint, the FCC deferred action on LAWCBB's challenge and
conditionally renewed the broadcast license until the final outcome
on the complaint was known. The result is that a final decision on
the citizens' group action was delayed and the station continued to
operate as usual. The issue of discrimination by the broadcaster had
not been addressed by either agency three years after Ms. Lo Presto
filed the EEOC charges.
164. See note 156 and accompanying text, supra.
165. Id.
166. 57 F.C.C.2d 277 (1975).
167. Id. at 284.
168. See note 71 and text at notes 33-34 supra for a discussion of the EEOC's own deferral
policy.
169. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) (1976).
170.See note 52-55 and accompanying text supra in which the difficulties of the EEOC's
departure from its organic statute are discussed.
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Deferral after EEOC Determination: NBC, Inc.
When the EEOC completes its investigation and finds that
there is "no reasonable cause to believe" that the broadcast licensee
has practiced employment discrimination, the complainant still has
the option of filing suit in federal district court."' If no suit is filed,
the FCC will treat the "no reasonable cause" finding as a final
EEOC decision." 2 In this situation the FCC may proceed just as
they would if no EEOC complaint had been filed-the Commission
will consider the pleadings to see if a substantial and material ques-
tion of fact has been raised which warrants a grant of hearing.
However, except when the EEOC has found a lack of "reasonable
cause to believe," the definition of a final EEOC outcome has been
problematic. In NBC, Inc., 73 the concept of an EEOC final outcome
was given substance of a sort which may have a chilling effect on
future challenges to license renewals."' In this challenge, the EEOC
had already found reasonable cause to believe that women employ-
ees of an NBC owned and operated station were the victims of
employment discrimination."' The 27 women who had filed the
complaint were then cited as specific instances of discrimination in
a license renewal challenge."' The FCC decided that the
"reasonable cause" finding was not a final EEOC outcome, deferred
action on the Petition to Deny and conditionally renewed the li-
cense."' Then, when EEOC conciliation reached an impasse, the
FCC determined the issue by their own standard, giving little or no
weight to the EEOC finding.7 8
171. See notes 26-27 and accompanying text, supra.
172. Cf. CBS, Inc., 62 F.C.C.2d 52 (1976); Miami Valley Broadcasting Corp., 56 F.C.C.2d
399 (1975).
173. National Broadcasting Co., Inc., 52 F.C.C.2d 273 (1975); 57 F.C.C.2d 668 (1976); 58
F.C.C.2d 419 (1976); aff'd. sub nom. NOW v. FCC, 555 F.2d 1002 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
174. In note 158, supra, it is apparent that the number of license renewal challenges
decided by the FCC is decreasing. 1975 with 37 reported decisions appears to be the peak
year. Following that year the number has radically declined. So far in 1978, 2 license renewal
challenge decisions have been published in the FCC Reports advance sheets. Admittedly,
correlation does not equal causation. In all probability, the overall negative response of the
FCC is the cause of the decrease. The NBC decisions are, however, most representative of
the discouraging stance taken by the Commission in relation to license renewal challenges.
175. NBC, Inc., 52 F.C.C.2d 273, 288, 292 (1975).
176. Id.
177. Id. at 295.
178. NBC, Inc., 58 F.C.C.2d 419, 422-27 (1976) describes the process used by the Commis-
sion. Essentially, this consisted of consideration of the pleadings of both parties and then
looking at updated employment statistics. The Commission concluded:
Based upon the entire record developed in this proceeding, we are convinced that
NBC has taken steps to assure that all persons, regardless of race or sex, are given
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When the FCC makes a decision to defer action and conditionally
renew the license, even when there is a "reasonable cause to believe"
determination, this decision is arguably justified as a provisional
step until the results of conciliation are known."' However, there is
no apparent justification for the FCC to wait for EEOC determina-
tions and then proceed as though they never occurred. If the FCC
uses its own standard before and after deferral, then the result
should be the same whether or not a petition to the FCC is inter-
rupted by a deferral-that is, the EEOC determination is effectively
ignored by the FCC. Since, the FCC has decided that the results of
the deferral are not of sufficient importance to warrant its consid-
eration, one must question the purpose of this obstructive delay.
This question may be answered in part by the FCC's expressed
policy to overlook issues of past discrimination and, instead, to
evaluate the broadcaster's current efforts for compliance.'s Clearly,
it appears that the deferral policy is no more and no less than a
device to provide extra time to the licensee so that the FCC can
avoid the distasteful task of imposing disciplinary measures. In the
words of the 1977 CoMMIssIoN REPORT:
Thus it appears that the FCC is not interested in eliminating dis-
crimination by its licensees. Instead, it is interested only in learn-
ing that licensees intent to make good faith efforts to provide equal
employment opportunity. 8'
The final results in Metromedia, Inc. and NBC, Inc. are repre-
sentative of those which have repeatedly occurred in the application
of the FCC's deferral policy.'82 In this regard, the FCC's rationale
for their actions is of interest.
equal employment opportunities at WRC-TV. Thus, we believe that no substantial
or material questions of fact have been raised with respect to the licensee's perform-
ance in this area.
Id. at 427, para. 26.
179. The FCC argued:
Although we recognize that the "reasonable cause to believe" determination con-
cluded the EEOC's "fact-finding" process, the Commission was concerned that we
not unduly influence the conciliation process by issuing an independent finding on
the charges raised before us which might sway either party to refrain from good
faith negotiation.
Id. at 419.
180. Even assuming the occurrence of . . . past violations, our task is to assess their
significance and present compliance with our EEO rules. Id. at 422. This practice was upheld
in NOW v. FCC, 555 F.2d 1002, 1016-18 (1977).
181. CoMMIssioN REPORT, supra note 11, at 135 (1977). Such good faith efforts are demon-
strated by statistics that are within the zone of reasonableness as defined in text at notes 128-
29, supra.
182. See note 156, supra, for a listing of cases in which deferral has occurred.
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FCC RATIONALE FOR ITS DEFERRAL POLICY
In Metromedia, Inc.," the FCC deferred action on a Petition to
Deny to await the EEOC outcome on an individual instance of
discrimination cited in the Petition. The action was deferred be-
cause a complaint based upon the same facts had been pending
before the EEOC for three years with no determination. The FCC
therein advanced several specific arguments for their policy.
The first argument is couched in terms of remedy. The FCC con-
tends that their responsibility is to serve the public interest in the
broadcast industry and not to conciliate differences between em-
ployer and employee."' Inherent in this argument is the assumption
that the inclusion of an individual employment discrimination com-
plainant in the license renewal challenge in effect asks the FCC to
conciliate the claim. Yet, distinctly different remedies are sought by
the parties to the Title VII and the FCC actions. In the Title VII
action, an individual files a complaint seeking conciliation efforts
from the EEOC. Ultimately such remedies as back pay and senior-
ity may be sought from the federal court. Conversely, an FCC li-
cense renewal challenge is usually brought by a citizens' group act-
ing in the public interest, requesting a hearing to allow them to show
why the FCC should deny the license renewal application. The FCC
was correct when it stated that its function is not conciliation. It
failed to recognize, however, that no demand was made for concilia-
tion.
Secondly, the FCC claims it doesn't have the expertise to exam-
ine and conciliate individual complaints."5 Again, it assumes that
the remedy sought is one it is not authorized to give. The ques-
tion of its expertise to make a determination regarding employ-
ment discrimination, indeed, may be legitimate. Nevertheless, con-
sidering that the FCC is an agency which regulates a particularly
specialized industry, it probably has more expertise than the
EEOC in analyzing employment statistics and hiring and promo-
tion patterns in this particular industry. 86
183. 57 F.C.C.2d 277 (1975), appealed and decided as Los Angeles Women's Coalition for
Better Broadcasting v. FCC (Metromedia, Inc. Intervenor), Sept. 12, 1978 (sl. op.). The court
upheld the Commission's delay of action pending the EEOC outcome. (si. op. at 4, note 2).
184. Petitions for Reconsideration, CBS, Inc., Metromedia, Inc., and KCOP Television,
Inc., 37 R.R.2d 972, 979 (1976).
185. Id.
186. In 1972 the FCC created an "EEO Unit" which was to evaluate sufficiency of equal
employment opportunity compliance efforts. Funding of this bureau was inadequate; for
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Third, the FCC argues that if both agencies make a determination
of the ultimate fact of employment discrimination, there would be
a duplication of effort.'" But, the ultimate fact issue of
"employment discrimination" is determined by each agency using
different methods. The EEOC undertakes an investigation of the
work situation to see if the discriminatory act occurred or if an
ongoing discriminatory situation really exists. The FCC, on the
other hand, does not investigate but considers the pleadings of chal-
lenger and licensee to determine whether the licensee's employment
figures are in the zone of reasonableness and the licensee has an
adequate affirmative action plan. Notwithstanding these gross dif-
ferences in methodology, the FCC says that because the same ulti-
mate fact is in issue in both actions, it will defer its agency action
on that issue until there is a final decision on the EEOC com-
plaint. *
Fourth, the FCC construes the legislative purpose of the EEOC
as that of relieving other agencies of employment discrimination
disputes, thereby allowing the FCC to concentrate its efforts on
its primary objectives.'" This argument is based upon an appar-
ent misinterpretation of a recent Supreme Court case involving the
Federal Power Commission (FPC). In NAACP v. FPC,9 0 the Na-
tional Association for the Advancement of Colored People peti-
tioned the FPC for a rulemaking to adopt a rule based upon its
statutory "public interest" mandate and giving the FPC jurisdic-
tion over the employment discrimination practices of their regula-
tees."' The court upheld the FPC's refusal to do so, stating the
general principle that a regulatory commission "is authorized to
consider the consequences of discriminatory employment practices
on the part of its regulatees only insofar as such consequences are
directly related to that Commission's particular statutory responsi-
bilities."' 2 In saying this, the court took particular notice of the
FCC in a footnote:
instance, in 1974, its budget was $55,000. However, in a phone conversation an FCC repre-
sentative in Washington, D.C., on October 27, 1978, stated that every division of the FCC
(e.g., cable, broadcasting, federal employees divisions) has its own EEO compliance unit.
Arguably, this arrangement would allow the development of expertise in the analysis of
broadcast industry employment figures.
187. Petitions for Reconsideration, supra note 184, at 979.
188. 57 F.C.C.2d 277, 284 (1975).
189. Id.
190. NAACP v. The Federal Power Commission, 425 U.S. 662 (1972) [hereinafter cited as
NAACP v. FPC].
191. 48 F.P.C. 40 (1972).
192. NAACP v. FPC, supra note 190, at 663 (emphasis added).
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The Federal Communications Commission has adopted regula-
tions dealing with employment practices of its regulatees....
These regulations can be justified as necessary to enable the FCC
to satisfy its obligation under the Communications Act of 1934
. . . to ensure that its licensees' programming fairly reflects the
tastes and viewpoints of minority groups.' 3
The FCC, in relying upon the NAACP decision to bolster its argu-
ment, has disregarded the words "to ensure that its licensees' pro-
gramming fairly reflects the tastes and viewpoints of minority
groups." In their 1968 Rulemaking Proposal,"' the FCC recognized
the proposition inherent in this obligation-that elimination of
employment discrimination is a necessary means to that end."' Now
the FCC appears to be disclaiming any such duty, despite the pre-
vious explicit recognition of this duty by both the Commission and
the courts."'
In NBC, Inc.,'" the FCC delayed action on a complaint filed by
27 individuals on which the EEOC had already made a "reasonable
cause to believe" determination. Again, the FCC distinguished its
standards and proceedings from the EEOC's. The first distinction,
as in Metromedia, Inc., was based on remedies. An EEOC determi-
nation is a "gateway" to informal methods of conference, concilia-
tion and persuasion."'8 An FCC decision, on the other hand, can lead
to an evidentiary hearing."' As valid as this distinction might be,
the problem lies with the underlying assumption that the two differ-
ent parties before the two different agencies are requesting the same
remedies. As previously explained, this is not so.200
Secondly, the FCC differentiated the legislative intent and pur-
pose of the two commissions. The EEOC's purpose is to make ag-
grieved persons whole through conciliation;2 o' whereas -the FCC's
purpose is to regulate in the public interest, not to provide individ-
ual remedies.2 02 As in Metromedia, Inc., the FCC implicitly and
193. Id. at 670.
194. 1968 Rulemaking Proposal, supra note 6, at 770.
195. See text at notes 105-07 supra for the Commission's reasoning.
196. See notes 106-08 and 190-93 and accompanying text, supra.
197. NBC, Inc., 52 F.C.C.2d 273 (1975); 57 F.C.C.2d 668 (1976); 58 F.C.C.2d 419 (1976);
aff'd sub nom NOW v. FCC, 555 F.2d 1002 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
198. 58 F.C.C.2d 419, 521, para. 6.
199. Id.
200. See text at note 184 supra.
201. NBC, Inc., 58 F.C.C.2d 419, 421 para. 6 (1976).
202. Id.
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erroneously assumed that the remedy sought was the same in both
forums.
Third, and again in line with Metromedia, Inc., the FCC miscon-
strued NAACP v. FPC. Completely ignoring the footnote in that
case which referred explicitly to its authority to regulate licensee
employment practices, the FCC states that its primary statutory
objective is that of regulating interstate and foreign commerce in
communications, not remedying employment discrimination per
se."* The Commission then proceeded to define its regulatory task
as being that of assessing the significance of past EEO violations in
light of the licensee's subsequent performance and present compli-
ance with their EEO rules.2 04 The FCC thereby specifically pre-
served the "second chance" given licensees in the past; if it looks
as if a licensee has practiced employment discrimination, the FCC
turns its back until the licensee's employment figures have im-
proved.205 The message inherent in this practice is the FCC has no
commitment to effectively deal with employment discrimination in
broadcasting and will go to great lengths to avoid having to invoke
any kind of a penalty upon the licensee.
The fourth argument in NBC, Inc. further illustrates the passive
attitude of the FCC and its avoidance of employment discrimina-
tion issues. This argument goes one step further than Metromedia,
Inc. and represents the final link in a circular rationale that has
enabled the Commission to totally avoid employment discrimina-
tion issues. The FCC again distinguished its standard of employ-
ment discrimination from that of the EEOC. "[T]he showing of
prima facie inconsistency with the public interest under section
309(d) of the Communications Act and of reasonable cause to be-
lieve the truth of discrimination charges under Title VII . . . are of
a different nature and weight."216 With this statement the FCC
recognized the obvious and legitimate differences between the pro-
cedures and standards of the two agencies. However, a crucial gap
in its logic occurred when it likened the FCC to a federal dis-
203. This apparently is a rescission of the FCC's previous policy statements in which they
linked ascertainment and employment policies. See notes 105-07 and accompanying text,
supra, for its previous policy statements. This attitude suggests a regression to the days when
it was argued that the FCC should be regarded as a traffic officer of wave lengths concerned
only with technical interference between stations.
204. NBC, Inc., 58 F.C.C.2d 419, 422, para. 7 (1976).
205. See figures in note 156 supra for instances in which the FCC has conditionally renewed
broadcast licenses contingent upon the submission of new data or a final EEOC outcome.
206. NBC, Inc., 58 F.C.C.2d 419, 421, para. 5 (1976).
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trict court and said that because an EEOC "reasonable cause" de-
termination did not constitute a prima facie case in a Title VII suit
in federal district court, the FCC would apply its own standard.2 07
The Commission concluded: "Thus, we intend to exercise our dele-
gated authority to render an independent determination of the ef-
fect of an adverse EEOC finding, consistent with our primary statu-
tory obligations."
At first glance, the FCC's multi-faceted explanation appears to
derive solely from what is known as the primary jurisdiction doc-
trine. However, closer scrutiny indicates that the FCC is commin-
gling the primary jurisdiction doctrine with the separate and possi-
bly incompatible principle of independence of forums which has
recently developed in the area of employment discrimination law.2 09
As demonstrated, when used in conjunction with one another, the
policies based upon these principles effectively shield the FCC from
carrying out its responsibility to eliminate employment discrimi-
nation.
PRIMARY JURI$DICTION DOCTRINE
The concept of primary jurisdiction is a judicial doctrine,2 10
closely allied in its basic function and concept to the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies."' The primary jurisdiction
doctrine provides that when there is concurrent jurisdiction between
the courts and an administrative agency, court action should be
deferred212 to await resolution of factual issues falling within the
special competence of the agency.'
207. Id. at 421 para. 4.
208. Id. at 422, para. 7 (emphasis added).
209. See notes 227-48 and accompanying text, infra.
210. The primary jurisdiction doctrine originated in Texas and Pacific Railway Co. v.
Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426 (1907). In this case the Supreme Court overrode explicit
statutory provisions that allowed the court to act in the first instance and deferred action on
the total cause of action until the Interstate Commerce Commission could make findings of
fact.
211. L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE AcTION, 121 (1965); K. DAVIS, ADMINIS-
TRATIVE LAW TEXT, 373 (1972).
212. Court action is stayed or deferred, rather than dismissed, until the agency makes a
decision. United States v. Western P. Ry. Co., 352 U.S. 59, 63-64 (1956); Note, The Doctrine
of Primary Jurisdiction: A Reexamination of Its Purpose and Practicality, 48 GEO. L.J. 563,
564, (1960); III K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE, § 19.07(2), at 42-43 (1958).
213. G. and A. Contractors, Inc. v. Alaska Greenhouses, Inc., 517 P.2d 1379, 1383 (Alas.
(1974)). See generally Note, Developments in the Law-Res Judicata, 65 HARv. L. REV. 818,
865-74 (1952); Comment, Administrative Law-Res Judicata-Application of Res Judicata
to Agencies with Parallel Jurisdiction, 52 DEN. L.J. 595 (1975).
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A primary feature of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is its
"flexibility permitting the courts to make a workable allocation of
business between themselves and the agencies."2" It is not designed
to divide the powers between courts and agencies but only to deter-
mine which forum should make an initial decision or exercise origi-
nal jurisdiction.' The underlying basis of the doctrine is a recogni-
tion of the need for orderly and sensible coordination of the work of
agencies and courts.2 " The regard for administrative expertise is
also a factor.2 17
When the court is confronted with problems within an agency's
area of specialization, it should have the advantage of whatever
contributions the agency can make to its final decision.2 " Thus, to
reach a conclusion in the most efficient manner, court action on
issues of an agency's jurisdiction and expertise may be deferred
until agency findings are obtained. After the agency has returned
its findings, the court may exercise its jurisdiction over the remain-
ing issues to provide a resolution of the total cause of action."'
The EEOC certainly has special competence to decide issues of
employment discrimination. Therefore, the FCC's policy of defer-
ring employment discrimination matters to the EEOC is not in itself
inconsistent with the primary jurisdiction doctrine. Two vital ques-
tions arise at this point. The first is in regard to the length of time
necessary to obtain an EEOC final decision. Because it usually
takes at least two years to obtain an EEOC determination and even
longer to reach a court decision or to conclude conciliation, deferring
to the EEOC does not contribute to the orderly and sensible coordi-
nation of the work of the two agencies. Indeed, the effect is the
214. CAB v. Modem Air Transport, Inc., 179 F.2d 622, 625 (2d Cir. 1950). See generally
Jaffe, Primary Jurisdiction, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1037 (1964); Davis, Administrative Law
Treatise, vol. 3, § 19, (Supp. 1970).
215. United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, 372 U.S. 321, 353 (1963). See generally
K. DAVIS, supra note 210, at § 19.01 at 3; L. JAFFE, supra note 211, at 121.
216. This need for uniformity has been pointed out by various sources. See Comment,
Administrative Law-Res Judicata-Application of Res Judicata to Agencies with Parallel
Jurisdiction, supra note 211, at 611; Jaffe, Primary Jurisdiction, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1037, 1052
(1964); K. DAVIS, supra note 210, § 19.01, at 5; L. JAFFE, supra note 211, at 123.
217. Comment, Administrative Law-Res Judicata, supra note 213, at 611 (1965); K.
DAVIS, supra note 212, § 19.01, at 5; L. JAFFE, supra note 211, at 123.
218. K. DAVIS, supra note 212, § 19.01, at 53.
219. Davis cites as an argument for this proposition the fact that courts often decide not
only questions of law but also questions of policy. Id. Therefore, the courts should take the
agency determination and use it within the broad context of the case at hand, taking into
account other relevant variables such as law and policy. In effect, this means that the agency
determination is not binding upon the court. L. JAFFE, supra note 211, at 124.
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opposite. Deferral only delays decisions on license renewal chal-
lenges so that final FCC decisions on the renewals frequently are not
reached until the licensee is well into the subsequent license period.
It is difficult to understand how the FCC could construe this result
as increased order and sensible coordination of agency functions.
Secondly, the contributions of the EEOC determination play a de
minimis role in the final FCC decision because the FCC has made
a habit of discounting the agency findings, even though they purport
to defer in order to benefit from the agency's expertise. Granted, the
court, under the primary jurisdiction doctrine, is not bound by the
agency's determination; it must consider the determination in the
total context of facts and law in arriving at its own decision.2 2 0 The
primary reason for the court's deferral is to gain useful information
for its decisionmaking process. In contrast, the FCC is quite open
in its disregard for the EEOC determinations.
The FCC's reliance upon the primary jurisdiction doctrine as the
basis for its deferral policy rests on tenuous grounds. It has been
suggested only occasionally that the concept of primary jurisdiction
could be applied to administrative agencies with concurrent juris-
diction.2 2' The result of such an application would be that if issues
raised in proceedings under one agency are arguably within its juris-
diction, but another agency has been created with specific jurisdic-
tion over these issues, the latter agency would be called on to make
the initial decision.2 22 Strong authority to support such an applica-
tion of the primary jurisdiction doctrine does not appear to exist.
Of major sources surveyed, the sole mention of the primary jurisdic-
tion doctrine in relation to interagency conflicts is found in one
paragraph section of American Jurisprudence 2d. 2 3 It is interesting
that the FCC relies upon this particular source when asserting the
primary jurisdiction doctrine as the basis for its deferral policy. 2
The manner in which the FCC has implemented the primary
220. See note 219 and accompanying text, supra.
221. Comment, Administrative Law-Res Judicata, supra note 213, at 611; Ed. Note, Res
Judicata and Administrative Jurisdiction-A Proposal for Resolving Conflicts BetweenAgen-
cies with Overlapping Jurisdiction, 35 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1056, 1063 (1967).
222. Comment, Administrative Law-Res Judicata, supra note 213, at 611.
222. It is proper and necessary that each administrative agency should respect
the boundary between it and another administrative agency where . . . a question
exists as to which of two administrative agencies has jurisdiction of a particular
activity.
223. 2 AM. Jun. 2d, Administrative Law, § 209 (1962). It should be noted that this concept
is not explicitly identified in AM. JUR. as being that of primary jurisdiction.
224. See NBC, Inc., supra note 146, at 292.
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jurisdiction doctrine bears little relation to the purpose of the doc-
trine and consequently raises some serious questions. The fact that
the doctrine is not widely accepted in interagency conflicts casts
further suspicion on its use by the FCC. In NBC, Inc., the FCC
demonstrated conclusively that it did not understand the under-
lying bases of the doctrines that it was using when it likened
itself to a federal district court' and said that it, like the
court, would proceed independently of the EEOC determination. 26
In asserting its independence from the EEOC, the FCC placed
itself into a totally different arena, that body of law and principles
arising from multiple forum actions in employment discrimination
law. This particular area of the law has emphasized independence
to such extent as to reject the concepts of exhaustion of remedies,
election of remedies, res judicata and collateral estoppel as relating
to actions brought concurrently or successively in various forums.
INDEPENDENCE OF FORUMS
Through the adoption of its deferal and "independence" policies
the FCC has worked toward the position first expressed by the Na-
tional Association of Broadcasters (NAB) in its objection to the
original adoption of the EEO Rules. 2 7 It was the NAB's position
that the FCC should not deal with the issue of employment discrim-
ination because Congress had delegated this function to the
EEOC.228 Admittedly, the Communications Act of 1934 does not
expressly authorize the FCC to perform such a function. However,
employment discrimination was not the important issue in 1934
that it is today, and it is reasonable to interpret the broad public
interest standard of the Act to authorize such regulations.229 The
implicit assumption made by the NAB and the FCC that the EEOC
has exclusive jurisdiction over matters of employment discrimina-
tion is contrary to reality.
Myriad rights and remedies are available to an individual who
has suffered employment discrimination.2 30 There is a consensus
225. NBC, Inc., 58 F.C.C.2d 419, 421, para. 4 (1976).
226. Id. at 422, para. 7.
227. See note 109 and accompanying text, supra.
228. Id. For a similar argument regarding the propriety of the National Labor Relations
Board as an enforcer of equal employment opportunity see Leiken, The Current and Potential
Equal Employment Role of the NLRB, 1971 DUKE L. REV. 833, 835.
229. Comment, Administrative Agencies, The Public Interest, and National Policy: Is a
Marriage Possible?, 59 GEO. L.J. 420, 426 (1970).
230. See note 104 supra for a partial list of major laws relating to employment discrimina-
tion. For discussions of multiple forum problems refer to the sources in note 44, supra.
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that by enacting Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Congress
intended to "supplement rather than supplant"2 3 ' the existing rights
and remedies relating to employment discrimination. Congress indi-
cated in the Civil Rights Act of 1964 that it intended the national
policy against employment discrimination to be of the "highest
priority."23 2 As a consequence, great stress has been placed on the
availability of a multiplicity of forums in which an aggrieved indi-
vidual can pursue remedies for discriminatory acts. Furthermore,
the legislative history of Title VII clearly expresses an intent to
allow an individual independently to pursue her rights under both
Title VII and other applicable federal and state statutes.2 11
Accordingly, there has been an emphasis on the independence of
Title VII rights from those of other measures designed to eliminate
employment discrimination. For example the courts have held that
the doctrines of exhaustion of remedies,' election of remedies, 23 5 res
231. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 48 (1974); Hebert & Reischel, supra
note 2, at 450; B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW, at 948 (BNA
1976).
232. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co. supra note 228, at 47 citing Newman v. Piggie Park
Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968).
233. For example, Senator Joseph Clark, one of the sponsors of the bill, intro-
duced an interpretative memorandum which stated: 'Nothing in title VII or any-
where else in this bill affects rights and obligations under the NLRA and the
Railway Labor Act. . . . [T]itle VII is not intended to and does not deny to any
individual, rights and remedies which he may pursue under other Federal and State
statutes. If a given action should violate both title VII and the National Labor
Relations Act, the National Labor Relations Board would not be deprived of juris-
diction.' 110 Cong. Rec. 7207 (1964). Moreover, the Senate defeated an amendment
which would have made Title VII the exclusive federal remedy for most unlawfull
employment practices. 110 Cong. Rec. 13650-13652 (1964). And a similar amend-
ment was rejected in connection with the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of
1972. See H.R. 9247, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). See also 2 U.S. Cong. Code and
Admin. News, 92 Cong., 2d Sess. (1972), pp. 2137-2179, 2181-2182. The report of
the Senate Committee responsible for the 1972 Act explained that the 'provisions
regarding the individual's right to sue under title VII, nor any of the other provisions
of the bill, are meant to affect existing rights granted under other laws.' S. Rep.
No. 92-415, 24, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). For a detailed discussion of the legisla-
tive history of the 1972 Act, see Sape and Hart, Title VII Reconsidered: The Equal
Opportunity Act of 1972, 40 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 824 (1972).
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver, supra note 231, at 47, n.9.
234. For example, the court has rejected the argument that proceedings must be initiated
with the National Labor Relations Board before charges are filed with the EEOC. Evans v.
Local 2127, IBEW, 313 F. Supp. 1354 (N.D. Ga. 1969); Austin v. Reynolds Metals Co., 327
F. Supp. 1145 (E.D. Va. 1970). Cf. Rubber Workers Local 12 v. NLRB, 368 F.2d 12, 24 (5th
Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 837 (1967). The argument also has been rejected that
procedures under a collective bargaining agreement must be exhausted prior to filing charges
with the EEOC. Culpepper v. Reyolds Metals Co., 421 F.2d 888, 892-893 (5th cir. 1970); Bowe
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judicata and collateral estoppel23 0 do not apply to actions comm-
enced concurrently or successively in various forums.
Title VII itself provides for consideration of employment discrimi-
nation claims by forums other than the EEOC. It assigns original
jurisdiction to state and local agencies for 60 days before it will
proceed with its own investigation23 7 and will commence jurisdiction
at the end of 60 days even if the state or local action is not com-
pleted. 238 Furthermore, court action may be initiated after the
EEOC has exercised jurisdiction for 180 days, regardless of whether
the EEOC has reached a determination.23 9
A determination in one forum does not preclude later action in
another. EEOC action is not barred by "findings and orders" of
state or local agencies. 240 The EEOC is required to give only
"substantial" rather than "conclusive" weight to final state agency
determinations. 2 1 A leading case in this area is Voutsis v. Union
Carbide Co., 24 2 in which it was held that an adverse finding and
v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969). See also Hebert and Reischel, supra
note 2, at 463-64. B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 231, at 943-44.
235. A series of early cases in Title VII litigation established that the employee would not
be forced at the outset to make an irrevocable choice of remedy. Bowe v. Colgate Palmolive
Co., 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969) held that the complainant could proceed concurrently under
both a collective bargaining agreement and in court under Title VII. The court placed a limit
on the use of concurrent procedures in that one could only be commended after adjudication
of the other claim "so as to preclude duplicative relief which would result in unjust enrich-
ment or windfall to the plaintiffs." Id. at 715. Cases following in other circuits affirmed this
principle. Fekete v. United States Steel Corp., 424 F.2d 331 (3d Cir. 1970); Newman v. Avco
Corp., 451 F.2d 743 (6th Cir. 1971); Culpepper v. Reynolds Metals Co., 421 F.2d 888 (5th Cir.
1970). For a discussion of election of remedies in relation to Title VII, see Beaird, supra note
44.
236. The leading case in this area is Alexander v. Gardner-Denver, Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974)
in which it was held that an employee can pursue his claim under Title VII even though it
has already been rejected by an arbitrator in a grievance proceeding brought by a union.
Consequently, this holding also represents a rejection of remedies under these circumstances.
Voutsis v. Union Carbide Co., 452 F.2d 889 (2d Cir. 1971) stands for the rejection of not only
res judicata but the election of remedies. In this case, the court held that a Title VII action
could commence even though a settlement had been entered into in a state action. See also
Cooper v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 464 F.2d 9 (6th Cir. 1972) (Claimant who had obtained "half
a loaf" through the efforts of a state agency is not precluded from attempting to get the rest
through invocation of EEOC or court procedures.) Good post-Alexander discussions may be
found in B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 231, at 945-60 and Belton supra note 44, at
235-39.
237. See text accompanying notes 35-41 supra.
238. Id.
239. See text accompanying notes 52-55 supra.
240. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1976).
241. Id.
242. 452 F.2d 889 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 918 (1972).
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contested settlement under state law does not preclude the com-
plainant from pursuing a Title VII remedy. However, if full remedial
measures have been obtained through one forum, the complainant
is estopped from seeking remedies elsewhere.113
A claimant's subsequent cause of action in federal court is not
barred by an EEOC finding of "no reasonable cause to believe" that
the Act has been violated' nor by the lack of an EEOC determina-
tion.245 The federal action would be a trial de novo so that the court
will make its own findings on factual issues.
Conflicts between the EEOC and agencies other than state fair
employment practices agencies have also led to the general conclu-
sion that action in each forum may be pursued independently. In
Alexander v. Gardner Denver, Co., 240 the leading case in this area,
the court held that an aggrieved employee could submit his claim
to final arbitration under the nondiscrimination clause of a collec-
tive bargaining agreement and then subsequently obtain a trial de
novo under Title VII.247 The court further indicated that the arbitral
decision would be admitted into evidence and that the weight to be
accorded this decision would be left to the court's discretion.""
Whether this conclusion is related to the traditional deference on
the part of the courts to arbitral decisions and whether it will be
further expanded to affect the weight given other agency decisions
in court are issues not yet addressed by the court.
Proceedings under Title VII, therefore, are completely indepen-
dent of other proceedings. This independence extends even to Title
VII actions in federal district court and investigations being made
by the EEOC and comparable state agencies; actions in these for-
ums may proceed concurrently. Thus, those forums most closely
tied to one another, the federal district court, the EEOC and similar
state agencies, maintain a status independent of one another. More-
over, a party before one of these forums is not required to exhaust
her remedies in order to proceed in another.
243. See, e.g., EEOC v. McLean Trucking Co. 525 F.2d 1007 (6th Cir. 1975), in which the
court held that when the complainant accepted an award of an arbitrator and settled with
his employer, he may not later sue his employer for additional benefits.
244. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 798-99 (1973).
245. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1976) and 29 C.F.R. § 1601.25(c) (1977) provide for the
issuance of a right to sue letter at the end of the 180 day investigation period.
246. 415 U.S. 36, 47 (1974).
247. Id. at 60.
248. Id.
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The FCC fails to grasp the necessity of rejecting the concept of
primary jurisdiction, i.e., exhaustion, when the doctrine of inde-
pendence of forums is adopted. If exhaustion in one forum were
necessary in order to proceed in another, the length of time required
for a given action would effectively preclude the possibility of pro-
ceeding in other available forums. This, however, is precisely the
effect brought about by the FCC's application of these two doc-
trines.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Admittedly, the FCC has made some limited improvement in the
past two or three years in their response to license renewal chal-
lenges that contain allegations of employment discrimination. This
is especially true for those challenges that have used statistical evi-
dence to show that discrimination has occurred. This improvement-
is evidenced by the fact that the commission has conditionally re-
newed numerous broadcast licenses contingent upon the results of
closer scrutiny of employment figures.24 The Commission has also
initiated the practice of performing a routine inquiry into broadcast-
ers' employment figures at license renewal time.25 0 However, the
scope of these inquiries has remained limited.2 5'
Notwithstanding their limited improvements the FCC must be
faulted for their use of the deferral mechanism in conjunction with
the practice of ignoring EEOC determinations. These policies have
combined with EEOC procedural shortcomings to effectively pre-
vent the FCC from implementing its EEO Rules in an effective
manner.52 Furthermore, the policies are based upon two incompati-
249. See note 156, supra.
250. Equal Employment Opportunity Inquiry, 36 F.C.C.2d 515 (1972).
251. Letters of inquiry are sent to stations with more than 10 employees only if:
(i) they employed no women, or showed a decline in the number of women employ-
ees from one annual employment report to the next; or (ii) being located in areas
with five percent or more of a minority population, they employed no minorities or
showed a decline in minorities between reporting periods.
Nondiscrimination of Licensees Employment Practices, 54 F.C.C.2d 354, 356, para. 8 (1975).
It is easy to see the flaw in these standards. For example, a station with a large number of
employees could employ only one woman and one minority and not receive a letter of inquiry
at renewal time because there was no decline in the number of members of these groups
employed.
252. The FCC decisions relating to these policies have not been unanimous. Certain com-
missioners have consistently objected to the virtually automatic renewal of licenses. See, e.g.,
Concurring Statement of Commissioner Benjamin L. Hooks, Nondiscrimination of Licensees'
Employment Practices, 54 F.C.C.2d 354, 370 (1975):
Eleven years have passed since enactment of Title VII and we are still discussing
procedures and the merits of the terms and conditions of affording EEO to women
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ble doctrines, primary jurisdiction and independence of forums, and
the primary jurisdiction doctrine has not obtained substantial ac-
ceptance in the interagency context.2 53
One recommendation is that Congress amend the Communica-
tions Act of 193421" to mandate specifically that the FCC implement
reporting and compliance procedures consistent with "those applied
by law, regulation and Executive Order to federal contractors.""'6
This means that Congress would require the FCC to collect employ-
ment data by the use of EEO-1 forms and to insist on the filing of
an affirmative action program by each broadcaster. This does not
differ much from current FCC procedure, except that the agency
procedure would become a statutory requirement.
Relying on NAA CP v. FPC,' the FCC has rejected this approach:
However, in our view, the procedures employed by this Commis-
sion to gather compliance data, must of necessity, bear a strong
relationship to the Commission's primary statutory pur-
pose-regulation of the broadcast industry in the public inter-
est. . . . To this end, we believe that the procedures adopted by
the Federal Communications Commission to enforce our nondiscri-
mination and equal employment opportunity rules, which have
and minorities. Enough time has been wasted-and enough talent!
Id. at 373. See also Dissent of Commissioner Nicholas Johnson, RadiOhio, Inc., 38 F.C.C.2d
721, 750-751 (1972); Dissenting Opinion of Commissioner Nicholas Johnson, Renewals of
Broadcast Licenses for Arkansas, Louisiana and Mississippi, 1973, 42 F.C.C.2d 3, 61-68
(1973); Statement of Commissioner Benjamin L. Hooks and Commissioner Joseph R. Fo-
garty, concurring in part; dissenting in part, Renewal Applications Serving State of Colorado,
65 F.C.C.2d 96, 112 (1977); Statement of Benjamin L. Hooks, concurring in part; dissenting
in part, Nondiscrimination in Employment Practices, 60 F.C.C.2d 226, 256 (1976), reiterating
position in NBC, Inc. 52 F.C.C.2d 273, 297 (1975) that an EEOC good cause finding should
establish a prima facie case for the FCC proceedings.
253. See note 223, supra, and accompanying text.
254. H.R. 15168(d)(5)(D), 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 122 CONG. REc. 8699-8700 (1976) to amend
Section 307(d) of the Communications Act of 1934. Introduced in 1978 by Rep. Ottinger: 124
CONG. REc., H. 2615, 95TH CONG., 2D SESS. (April 6, 1978). H.R. 11951 to amend the Commu-
nications Act of 1934. Note: H.R. 11951 was superceded by H.R. 13015. The suggestions in
13015 will be discussed at text accompanying notes 280-85 infra.
Citizens' groups and governmental entities have endorsed this approach. See, e.g., Office
of Communications of the United Church of Christ, Draft of Legislation, Proposed Reform of
the Communications Act of 1934, December 24, 1977 (Xerox copy); COMMISSION REPORT,
supra note 11, at 137 n.43.
255. Executive Order 11246,'as amended by Executive Order 11357, 3 C.F.R. 169 (1977)
(issued in 1965 and 1967 respectively), prohibits discrimination in employment on the basis
of race, color, religion, sex and national origin by federal contractors. The Office of Federal
Contract Compliance Programs (OFCCP) of the Department of Labor has issued guidelines
that require contractors to establish and maintain affirmative action programs to eliminate
and prevent discrimination. Revised Order No. 4, 41 C.F.R. 60-2 (1977).
256. 425 U.S. 662, 670 (1976).
No. 1]1 169
COMM/ENT
been developed with the broadcast industry in mind, are adequate
and, indeed, have been effective.257
This rejection is based upon the FCC's continued misinterpretation
of NAACP v. FPC258 and their narrowed conception of their statu-
tory duty to regulate in the public interest.25 0
While painting a rosy picture of its "accomplishments", the
FCC further argues that its budget would not allow it to func-
tion in the same manner as federal contractors.26 0 This budgetary
objection contains two problems. First, the FCC is in effect saying
that the gathering of such compliance data is not a priority funding
item. This lack of priority demonstrates its lack of commitment
to the eradication of employment discrimination. Second, if such
action were statutorily mandated, Congress will have to make addi-
tional funding available.
The proposal for such FCC regulation is desirable in that it would
give specific Congressional mandate to FCC jurisdiction over dis-
criminatory employment practices in the broadcasting industry.
The Commission could no longer attempt to disclaim jurisdiction in
this area. However, no positive action or standards are prescribed
by this suggestion.
Another possibility that has been raised is a rather -grandiose
proposal that Congress consolidate all federal agencies which deal
with employment discrimination into one monolithic agency to be
responsible for processing all employment discrimination com-
plaints.2"' The only exceptions to the jurisdiction of this agency
257. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 11, at 137 n.43.
258. See text accompanying notes 190-96 and 202-03 supra. It is important to note that the
FCC began to correctly interpret the footnote in.NAACP v. FPC in a recent license renewal
challenge to find that the broadcaster did have a responsibility insofar as equal employment
opportunities are concerned. Gaylord Broadcasting Co., 67 F.C.C.2d 1012, 1014, n.4 (1978).
However, they continued to reach the same conclusion: that the employment figures were
within the zone of reasonableness.
This change in interpretation could be due in part to the change of membership on the
Commission. Chairman Charles Daniel Ferris and Tyrone Brown assumed their positions
with the Commission in October and November of 1977 respectively, replacing ex-Chairman
Richard E. Wiley and ex-Commissioner Benjamin L. Hooks. A certain amount of change in
the Commission appears to be looming on the horizon as a result of these new appointments.
See Mr. Ferris's FCC: Beginning to Get Its Act Together, Broadcasting, Dec. 5, 1977, at 18;
Special Report: The State of the Fifth Estate, Broadcasting, January 2, 1978, 28,.30 col. 2-3.
259. See text accompanying notes 202-03 supra.
260. CoMMIssIoN REPORT, supra note 11, at 137, n.43.
261. Beaird, Seventh Annual Law Symposium. Racial Discrimination in Employment:
Rights and Remedies, 6 GA. L. REv. 469, 486-87 (1972). A bill to create such an agency was
introduced in the House of Representatives in 1971 with the 1972 Amendments to the Civil
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would be continued deference to judgments under state fair employ-
ment practice laws and to decisions from the grievance-arbitration
process.2"2
This proposal must be considered cautiously as should any sweep-
ing plan to eliminate an existing scheme of regulatory enforcement
in order to place the regulatory interest involved under the protec-
tion of a single, new bureaucracy. The creation of a single mono-
lithic agency would eliminate existing alternate sources of protec-
tion, so should the monolith fail to be effective in combating em-
ployment discrimination, the discriminatee will have less opportun-
ity for remedy. Before the creation of a single federal agency to
regulate employment discrimination can be seriously considered,
the structure of this single agency must manifest a capacity to re-
spond effectively to the variety of discrimination problems that are
presently handled, albeit tenuously, by several agencies. However,
such a proposal must not preclude other agencies from dealing with
employment discrimination issues that necessarily are intertwined
with the subject matter of their regulation. This consolidation pro-
posal would be unacceptable if, for example, it were to preclude
parties from challenging broadcasting license renewals on the
ground of employment discrimination.
Various other ameliorative measures have been proposed. These
proposals range from passive acceptance of the FCC's policies to
suggestion that the FCC cooperate with other agencies.
A passive approach to the problem has been presented by one
author who merely offers suggestions on how best to frame pleadings
in a license renewal challenge Petition to Deny.2 63 This author por-
trays the FCC as being so intractable that it would be absolutely
unresponsive to proposed changes in policy. This approach pre-
sumes a totally inert administrative process. The tragedy of this
attitude is that it encourages citizens' groups to continue to file
license renewal challenges before an unreceptive commission.
Another writer suggested that the FCC should impose fines on
offending broadcasters which could be used to finance minority
Rights Act of 1964. H.R. 6760, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). It was passed by the House. Act
of Mar. 24, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, amending Title VII, §§ 701-16, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to
2000e-15 (1970). It was rejected by the Senate and the Conference Committee. See S. REP.
No. 681, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
262. Beaird, supra note 261, at 487.
263. Note, Petitioning to Deny Broadcast License Renewals, 16 WASHBURN L.J. 375 (1977).
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training or scholarship programs. Such fines could be imposed
under the forfeiture provisions of the Communications Act of
1934.265 Following this course of action would be far less disastrous
to the licensee than would be a denial of a license renewal. It would,
however, put the licensee on notice that continued violation of the
EEO Rules has a price attached. The FCC, no doubt, would find it
easier to lower its standards to reach a determination of employ-
ment discrimination if it could impose less severe disciplinary mea-
sures. Other equally meritorious suggestions include Congressional
action such as the use of tax incentives for participation in minority
employment plans2"' and the federal subsidy of such programs."6 It
is highly unlikely that such plans will be implemented, since years
have passed since they were suggested.
When the FCC adopted their EEO Rules, Assistant Attorney
General Pollack suggested that arrangements between the FCC and
EEOC should be made "to avoid duplication of effort and any un-
necessary burden upon broadcast licensees."268 Such an arrange-
ment could be in the form of a memorandum of understanding
which addresses the issues of orderly processing of complaints and
the standards to be used in reaching a determination on the issue
of employment discrimination. This understanding could ulti-
mately result in greater weight being given to the EEOC determina-
tion by the FCC.
The FCC has never taken steps to implement the Assistant Attor-
ney General's suggestion that the FCC and EEOC cooperate in their
efforts.269 The EEOC, on the other hand, has established memo-
randa of understanding with other agencies.270 The EEOC has dem-
onstrated its interest in seeking common standards and procedures
with the FCC in briefs submitted as amicus curiae on appeal in
264. Note, FCC Failure to Eradicate Employment Discrimination by Broadcast Licensees,
21 ST. Louis U.L.J. 150, 164 (1977).
265. Any licensee . . . who . . . willfully fails to observe . . . any rule or regula-
tion of the Commission prescribed under authority of this Chapter . . . shall forfeit
to the United States a sum not to exceed $1,000. Each day during which such
violation occurs shall constitute a separate offense. . . .
47 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(B).
266. Note, The FCC's Role in Providing Equal Employment Opportunity for Minority
Groups, 53 B.U.L. REV. 657, 691 (1973).
267. Id.
268. Letter of Assistant Attorney General S. Pollack, Civil Rights Division of the Depart-
ment of Justice, in 1968 Rulemaking Proposal, supra note 8, at 777.
269. The FCC may be forced to do so if legislation under consideration in Congress is
eventually implemented in its current form. See notes 281-85 and accompanying text, infra.
270. See, e.g., EEOC-OFCCP Cooperation on Government Contractor Complaints, Sept.
11, 1974. EMPL. PRAC. GUIDE, (CCH) 3780, p. 2099.
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NBC, Inc.271 Additionally, the EEOC recently tightened the eviden-
tiary standard to be met in order to make an EEOC "reasonable
cause to believe" finding. 27 "Reasonable cause" is now to mean that
a case is, in the EEOC's view, worth litigating either by EEOC or
by the private bar.27 3 Previously, the EEOC "reasonable cause"
standard was not uniform and in some instances complainants had
to supply little or no evidence in support of their allegations in order
for the burden to shift to the respondent. 24 A uniform strict stan-
dard leaves little room for interpretation of the meanihg of a reason-
able cause determination.
These factors, in conjunction with changes in FCC Commission-
ers, lead to the inescapable conclusion that the time is ripe for such
cooperative measures between the FCC and EEOC to occur. Since
the FCC does not appear to be prepared to initiate such action, it
is incumbent upon outside forces, either Congress or citizens'
groups, to prod them along.
If citizens were to take this task upon themselves they could file
a petition for rulemaking to force the FCC to address this issue. If
the FCC fails to adequately address the issue of cooperation by
entering into a memorandum of understanding, the matter could be
presented to the federal court of appeals. With this appeal, the state
action7 5 issue which was raised but not addressed in NAACP v.
FPC276 can be presented once again. The FCC's EEO rulemaking
271. NOW v. FCC, 555 F.2d 1002 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
Telephone conversation with staff member of amicus section of the EEOC in Washington,
D.C. on October 27, 1978, indicated that this is the sole amicus involvement by the EEOC
in an FTC license renewal challenge court appeal. Amicus curiae briefs were submitted by
the EEOC on September 23, 1975, and August 13, 1976. The EEOC also submitted briefs on
the same dates in the NOW action joined with NBC affiliate station in New York.
272. See CoMMIssIoN REPORT, supra note 11, at 225, n. 142: Memorandum from Alfred v.
Blumrosen, Office of the Chair to Eleanor Holmes Norton, Chair EEOC, "Recommendations
for Improving the Commission's Process, Structure and Systemic Programs." July 15, 1977
(revised July 18, 1977) in U.S. CIVIL RIGHTS COMM'N, THE FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTs ENFORCEMENT
EFFORT, 1977, supra note 22, at 225 n.142. EEOC COMPL. MAN. (CCH) § 30.1.
273. Id.
274. COMMIssION REPORT, supra note 11, at 225.
275. State action provides that "when a state has become a joint participant in a pattern
of . . . discriminatory conduct by placing itself in a position of interdependence with private
individuals acting in such a manner . . . this constitutes a type of 'state action' proscribed
by the Fourteenth Amendment." Etheridge v. Rhodes, 268 F. Supp. 83, 87 (S.D. Ohio 1967).
The doctrine of state action is applicable to the federal government through the fifth amend-
ment. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954).
Indeed, it was suggested early in the application of the recent civil rights laws that signifi-
cant state action questions would arise if a federal agency granted public largesse to a person
engaged in extensive violations of the civil rights laws. See Hebert and Reischel, supra note
2, at 484.
276. 425 U.S. 662 (1976).
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relied tangentially upon Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority."'
The subsequent decision in Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison,"' that
operation of a public utility is not state action, does cast some doubt
upon the feasibility of successfully raising the state action question.
However, the court's explicit statement in NAACP v. FPC that the
matter of employment discrimination was closely related to the
FCC's primary statutory function 27 indicates that the court would,
as it did in NAACP v. FPC, rely on statutory interpretation rather
than proceeding on the state action question.
Legislation under consideration in Congress, if implemented in its
current form, may avoid the necessity of having to take such action.
H.R. 13015 was introduced in the Second Session of the 95th Con-
gress280 and underwent an extensive hearing process for revisions in
the Subcommittee on Communications of the Committee on Inter-
state and Foreign Commerce. What revisions will occur through
these hearings is not yet clear.'
This bill provides for extensive reorganization of the FCC. The
portions relating to the FCC's EEO powers provide for licensees to
notify the FCC of "any final determination by any Federal, State,
or other court, or by any Government agency . . . of any violation
by such . . . licensee . . . of any applicable civil rights or equal
employment opportunity law" 282 within 5 days. It provides, further,
that the commission "shall consider any determination" as speci-
fied in deciding to grant, revoke or deny a license.' Finally, within
180 days of the effective date of the Act, the Commission is to enter
into a memorandum of understanding with the appropriate Govern-
ment agencies for the exchange of information. 284
These provisions, if adopted in an unaltered form would be an
277. 365 U.S. 715 (1961). See Pollack letter, supra note 8, at 776.
The use of the public domain would appear to confer upon the broadcast licensees
enough of a "public" character to permit the Commission to require the licensee
to follow the constitutionally grounded obligation not to discriminate on the
grounds of race, color, or national origin.
278. 364 U.S. 810 (1974).
279. 425 U.S. 662, 670 (1976).
280. H.R. 13015, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 124 CONG. REc. H. 4128 (1978). Introduced by Con-
gressman Van Deerlin and referred to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.
281. Phone conversation with staff member of Communications Subcommittee on Oct. 20,
1978 indicated that revisions of the bill were under way but would not be revealed until re-
introduced at the next session of Congress in 1979.
282. H.R. 13015, § 435(a), 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
283. Id. at § 435(b).
284. Id. at § 435(c).
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affirmative step forward. They provide specific Congressional man-
date for the FCC to consider discriminatory employment practices
in the renewal process. They further solve the problem of whether
or not the FCC has to consider the determinations of other agencies
and they ensure that the FCC will be forced into a more cooperative
stance in relation to other EEO agencies.
What remains unclear are the definitions of "final" agency deter-
mination and just what degree of consideration must be given to
other agency's determinations by the FCC. However, this step, if
taken by Congress, would be one of the strongest responses taken
in relation to the FCC's passive regulation in this area.
CONCLUSION
The FCC, apparently more in the spirit of the times than with any
sincere intent to change employment practices in the broadcast
industry, promulgated rules relating to discriminatory employment
practices. Now that the newness of the issue seems to be wearing
off, the Commission shows strong indications of a desire to retreat
from these rules.
The facts do not substantiate the FCC's contention that it
has done a good job of eliminating employment discrimination.
Ten years have passed since the first EEO Rules were proposed. At
least 120 television license renewal challenges alleging employment
discrimination have been filed in that period of time.285 Of these
challenges only three have been granted a hearing. The FCC has
repeatedly failed to address the issue of employment discrimina-
tion, primarily by shifting its evidentiary standards just at the time
that challengers have begun to meet them. Its failure, in conjunc-
tion with the EEOC's shortcomings, has created a void in the regu-
lation of employment discrimination in the broadcast industry. The
lack of progress in this area, and the continuing plight of women and
minorities in the industry is borne out by the results in the
COMMISSION REPORT.
It appears that the EEOC is attempting to correct many of its
shortcomings through recent reorganizational efforts. The FCC, on
the other hand, apparently will have to be prodded by outside forces
such as Congress and citizens' groups before it will significantly
change. It is likely that maximum change will occur only through
concomitant efforts of both of these segments of our society. Such
285. See note 93, supra.
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efforts must consist of the following: (1) Action by Congress specifi-
cally allocating jurisdiction over discriminatory employment prac-
tices in broadcasting to the FCC; (2) A willingness on the part of
citizens' groups to take the jurisdiction question to the courts for an
answer if Congress fails to act; and (3) Action by Congress and
citizens to demand that the FCC begin to cooperate with other
agencies, such as the EEOC, in the adoption of standards and proce-
dures to coordinate efforts. Only when such efforts occur will the
FCC necessarily be forced to attend to the issues it so far has
avoided.
